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ABSTRACT
Factors Influencing State Prescription Drug Policy
by Rochelle Rene’ Henderson

Within the realm of health care, prescription drugs have been of particular
concern for state legislators in terms of cost, safety, and distribution. Whether
prompted by financial, social, or political pressure, states have tried to address
issues associated with prescription medications by adopting or attempting to adopt
a variety of prescription drug policies. My dissertation expands beyond the
analysis of a singular prescription drug policy and examines the factors affecting
prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition, safety and distribution. A negative
binomial regression model is employed for each of the prescription drug policy
areas to ascertain the influence of internal, external and political factors. The
results suggest that factors influencing state prescription drug policy differ for each
of the policy subareas. In particular, proportion of the population with a bachelor’s
degree, neighboring states with a policy, and liberal ideology had an effect on the
number of prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition. However, the slack
financial resources, neighboring states with a policy and issue saliency had an
effect on the number of prescription drug policies aimed at safety. Additionally, the
proportion of the population with a bachelor’s degree, neighboring states with a
policy, and interest group financial contributions to legislators had an effect on the
number of prescription drug policies aimed at distribution. This dissertation
expands on our understanding of the factors influencing prescription drug policy.
The results indicate that factors influencing one particular policy arena may vary
when analyzing a subset of policies within a particular policy. Specifically, the
results suggest that factors influencing the adoption of prescription drug policy vary
across the three types of prescription drug policies of acquisition, safety and
distribution.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.” –
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
In his 1932 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis is
often credited with coining the term “laboratories of democracy.” He indicates that
although a weighty responsibility, states have the authority and obligation to
experiment, lest the nation as a whole suffer. In their role as laboratories, state
governments have attempted to address public concerns on issues ranging from
agriculture to transportation. State influence and impact on citizens is paramount
and strongly interlocked into the social and economic structure of the United
States. Furthermore, state policies affect almost every facet of American life
including marriage, employment, education, and health. Given the current political
and economic climate, state experimentation on the issue of health care is of
particular interest to political science scholars, the health care industry, patients
and professional groups.
Although health care is only one of the many issues on the public agenda,
state and local governments have been actively involved in supporting citizens’
quest for good health. With the establishment of state health boards in the 1870s,
states to a certain degree assumed responsibility for the public’s health through
the regulation of medicine and the promotion of sanitary and hygienic activities to
control and prevent disease. While initially focused on public health issues (e.g.,
water pollution, hygiene education, infectious diseases), states later addressed
concerns of professionalism by regulating physicians, hospitals, and nursing
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homes. Additionally, states’ role and responsibilities in health policy continued to
expand with the passage of Medicaid in 1965. Through the administration and
financial support required by Medicaid, states have become an integral part in the
health care of the poor and aged. In addition to the expanded reliance on states,
medical and technological advancements are also culprits in increased cost of
health care (Garrison, Jr. and Wilensky 46-58;Poisal et al. w242-w253). The rising
costs of health care, growing number of uninsured, and lack of a federal plan have
prompted states to address issues associated with the health of their citizens.
Within the realm of health care, prescription drugs have been of particular
concern for state legislators both in terms of cost and utilization. In the more than
70 years since Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, the number of prescription drugs that have been given FDA approval has
reached more than 3,000 (Preskorn 41-50). Although prescription drug costs
account for only 10% of the total health care costs, the rate of cost increase has
been larger than for other health care services. While other health care services
have experienced year over year increases in the single digits, prescription
medications have had double digit increases from one year to the next year
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services). In addition to an increase in the type
of medications available, the quantity of prescriptions sold in retail pharmacies has
increased significantly; reaching 3.4 billion sold in 2006 (National Association of
Chain Drug Stores Foundation). Prescription medications today are being used to
treat a variety of ailments ranging from hypertension to erectile dysfunction and are
being used to complement and, on occasion, replace physician office visits,
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hospitalizations, and other medical procedures (Lichtenberg 485-490Benefits and
costs of newer drugs: an update). However, the effect that prescription
medications have had on improved health outcomes has not come without a
corollary in terms of cost, utilization, and safety.
Whether prompted by financial, social, or political pressure, states have
tried to address issues associated with prescription medications by adopting or
attempting to adopt more than 3,000 policies aimed at addressing acquisition,
safety, and distribution of prescription medications (National Conference of State
Legislatures). Policy scholars have not ignored this phenomenon. For example,
Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007) analyzed factors affecting prescription drug
policy, focusing on a singular prescription policy aimed at access (i.e., Prescription
Assistance Programs). My dissertation expands beyond the analysis of a singular
policy and examines the factors affecting prescription drug policies aimed at
acquisition, safety, and distribution. In essence, my dissertation explores the
principal question “Why do some states tackle the issues of prescription drug
acquisition, safety, and distribution, while others do not?” In doing so, my
dissertation is operationalized into four questions. First, what are acquisition,
safety, and distribution state prescription drug policies? Second, in which states
have prescription drug policies been adopted? Third, what factors explain
prescription drug policy adoption? Are the explanatory factors consistent across
the three types of prescription drug policies (i.e., acquisition, safety, and
distribution)? In other words, are the factors that explain prescription drug policy
aimed at acquisition the same as the explanatory factors aimed at safety and
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distribution? Fourth, are the factors present in prescription drug policy consistent
with the factors found in other health policy analyses?
In essence, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the demographic,
political and institutional factors that influence whether a state chose to adopt
prescription drug policies. By analyzing the factors influencing the categories of
prescription drug policies as opposed to a singular prescription drug policy, the
dissertation explores the further application of innovation theory to the broader
issue of prescription drug policy.
Exploring the theoretical framework
With the passage of the U.S. Constitution and specifically the Tenth
Amendment, states have self-governing legal authority to create legislation.
Examining the factors related to legislation created by each state’s legislative
system as it relates to prescription medications is conceivably one of the most
interesting investigations of health policy in recent history. Prior to model
estimation, it is necessary to examine the theoretical framework that would assist
in explaining the phenomenon that is state prescription drug policy which includes
policy typology theory and innovation theory.
Typology theory
Although the overall objective of state prescription drug policies is to provide
citizens with access to much needed medications while protecting their well being,
there are variations in the types of approaches employed by states to achieve this
goal. The assortment of policy objectives, forms, and stakeholders involved in
these policies suggest a difference in factors affecting state prescription drug
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policy. The application of policy typology theory assists in the systematic
evaluation of the more than 3,000 prescription drug policies. It is through the
development of typologies that scholars have attempted to simplify the
examination of the complex system that is public policy (Lowi 677-715;Lowi 298310;Wilson;Longest).
Undoubtedly, Theodore Lowi is considered one of the most influential
scholars in the area of policy typology. Lowi’s theoretical development of policy
classification allowed for the examination of policies in terms of their impact on
society and arena of power by examining whether actors have similar interests,
competing interests, and ideological foundation. Simply stated, policy typology
literature suggests that policies differ in their influence on political actors, their
relationships and the power structure and corresponding stability. His initial
analysis indicated that the three unique policy types existed (i.e., distributive,
redistributive, and regulatory) and had differing effects on politics and
stakeholders. Lowi defined distributive policies as those policies that benefit a few
and most often associated with policies that bring benefits back to the
Congressional district. Redistributive policies benefit those of a particular class -;
most often through the process of reallocating wealth. According to Lowi’s
typology, redistributive policy has clear winners and losers with the winners
tending to be of lower social class. Regulatory policies are those policies that limit
or enable the actions of one group or another. Regulatory policy “involves a direct
choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived” (Lowi, 1964, 690).
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Beyond simple categorization of policy, typology literature suggests that the
stakeholders involved, policy objectives, and ideological foundation vary by policy
category. Lowi (1964) provides theoretical foundation suggesting that not all
policies are created equal in terms of their effect. While acquisition, safety and
distribution policies may be categorized as regulatory policy, under Lowi’s
typology, safety and distribution policies differ in their effect on policy objectives,
stakeholders, and forms; thus, each is discussed separately in this analysis. In the
case of prescription drug policies, acquisition policies are those that enable or limit
one group over another.
Hence, for both theoretical and practical purposes, this dissertation
employed a “big three” approach in policy presentation that is similar to John
Kingdon’s (2003) discussion of the “big three” health policy issues (i.e., cost,
access, and quality). Using Lowi and Longest as a guide, the prescription drug
policies are categorized into acquisition, safety, and distribution. From a practical
perspective, the categorization of prescription drug legislation into three general
categories (1) acquisition, (2) safety, and (3) distribution allows for analysis of the
more than 3,000 different prescription drug policies into three succinct constructs.
At a high level, all prescription drug policies might be considered access
because each piece of legislation is designed to either limit the means of acquiring
medications (e.g. those considered potentially harmful) or provide the means to
needed medications (e.g. state funding). Although the underlying assertion of
prescription drug policy may impact access to medications, the specific
prescription drug policies adopted over the past ten years have coalesced around
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three primary objectives. The first include policies that are designed to assist
individuals with the means to acquire prescription medications. These policies
include financial, informational, or institutional strategies to facilitate the acquisition
of prescription medications. Acquisition policies include those policies that are
intended to increase access to needed prescription medications through
employment of market approaches; those policies that use state dollars to assist
the elderly or poor with access to prescription medications; policies that utilize
institutions to maximize access. The second set of policies includes those
designed to address the safety issues related to prescription medications. Safety
policies are regulatory policies that are intended to mitigate the possibility of
misuse, abuse, adverse drug events or medication errors. Lastly, the policies
designed to regulate the pharmaceutical distribution within the state borders.
Distribution policies are regulatory policies intended prohibit or restrict the
marketing and advertising of prescription medications or in some other way
regulate the prescription drug distribution entities.
Theoretically speaking, while policy specifics vary within each particular
category (i.e., acquisition, safety, or distribution) the policy participants and
objectives are cohesive and can thus be examined in terms of the factors affecting
prescription drug policy. For example, although safety and distribution would be
categorized as regulatory, the actors, interests, and objectives are dissimilar and
thus suggest differing factor influences. Thus these policies were examined
separately.
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Innovation and diffusion theory
In addition to typology theory, innovation and diffusion theories provide a
framework for evaluation of the numerous state prescription drug policies. Over
the past 40 years, political science scholars have spent a great deal of time and
energy investigating why state governments do something new rather than
continuing with the status quo. Political scientists have conducted a number of
state policy analyses exploring the factors influencing policy adoption and diffusion
(Walker 880-99;Mohr 111-26;Gray 1174-85;Berry and Berry 395-415;Case, Hines,
and Rosen 285-307;Mintrom 41-59;Berry and Baybeck 505-19). Much of their
focus has been directed in studying the degree to which external and internal
factors influence state policy adoption. Previous researchers have evaluated
policy adoption in terms of policy stages (Dye 1984) and resources (Bingham
1976; Downs and Mohr 1974; Downs 1976; Walker 1969) and at least three
researchers have considered the effects of internal or external determinants on
state health policy (Gray et al., 2007b; Pracht and Moore 2003; Miller, 2005).
Much like an Agatha Christie mystery novel, there are many suspects in the
adoption of prescription drug policy, some of which include internal factors (e.g.,
state budget, elderly, poverty) and external factors (e.g., other state activities,
political party control).1 While Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007) have used
innovation theory to examine a single access prescription drug policy (i.e., State
Pharmacy Assistance Programs), no known research has been conducted
analyzing the factors affecting safety or distribution prescription drug policies. This
1

In his article, Tuning in, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America,
Robert Putnam uses the Agatha Christie analogy to examine why citizen engagement has
declined over time. (Putnam 664-83;Putnam)

Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 12
dissertation relies on innovation theory as the theoretical foundation for
examination of the factors of prescription drug policy adoption.
Study Specifics
Four approaches were used to address the key questions of interest. First,
a literature review on policy typology and policy innovation was conducted. The
theoretical framework provides the foundation for examining which factors
influence adoption of the three types of prescription drug policy.
Second, state prescription drug policies were examined and categorized
according to the policy typology previously described. The unit of analysis was
one observation for each state each year. The study comprised a pooled crosssectional time series using data from 1999 through 2008 where each case
represented a state-year. Both practical and theoretical reasons guided the
selection of this time period. From a theoretical standpoint the last ten years have
been the most active in terms of prescription drug policy. The increased use,
changes in approval process, and rising drug costs have put prescription
medications on the public agenda. From a practical standpoint, the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) compiled data on prescription drug policy
for the last ten years.
The methodology for the classification of state prescription drug policies as
acquisition, safety, or distribution is discussed in Chapter 6. Given the breadth and
depth of prescription medication use, it is conceivable that states adopt policies
with either multiple or ambiguous objectives and are not easily categorized. These
prescription drug policies are isolated for additional exploration.
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Third, a series of maps are presented to depict the number of prescription
drug policies by each state. The maps illustrate the density and dispersion of
prescription drug policies across the U.S. over the last decade.
Fourth, a statistical model was employed to analyze the factors influencing
prescription policy. For the three types of prescription drug policy, a model to
identify the key factors that contribute to the state policy adoption was created and
tested. Based on the work of previous innovation and diffusion scholars as a
framework, the explanatory variables for model consideration included state
demographic characteristics, state wealth, interest group activity, legislative
professionalism, issue saliency, and political factors (i.e., state ideology, legislative
party) (Walker 880-99;Mohr 111-26;Gray 1174-85;Berry and Berry 395-415;Berry
and Baybeck 505-19;Case, Hines, and Rosen 285-307;Mintrom 41-59;Gray,
Lowery, and Godwin 89-129;Miller Edward Alan 2639-57).
Dissertation Plan
Over the course of eight chapters, this dissertation examines the state
characteristics present in prescription drug policy expanding on the existing
knowledge base related to policy innovation and diffusion. In the first chapter, I
introduce the reader to the topic of this dissertation and why it is important. In the
second chapter, I discuss the previous empirical evidence related to policy
innovation and describe the theoretical constructs with which to examine state
prescription drug policy. This chapter discusses innovation and interest group
literature which are critical to the examination of prescription drug policy adoption.
In particular, I will make a case for the inclusion and/or exclusion of factors
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attributed to influencing state policy adoption. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters
contain a description and discussion of the specific state prescription drug policies
within the constructs of acquisition, safety, and distribution. I propose that the
factors influencing each policy category (i.e., acquisition, safety, and distribution)
are theoretically different and thus should each be discussed in a separate
chapter. The sixth chapter contains my methodological approach and research
design, while the seventh chapter presents the analytical results. In the final
chapter, I draw conclusions on the factors influencing state prescription drug
policy. In essence, I will explore how my analysis complements, contradicts, and
contributes to the existing understanding of state prescription drug policy. State
lawmakers, political scientists and others may be interested to find the variation in
factor effect across prescription drug policies.
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CHAPTER 2: CAUSAL MECHANISMS OF STATE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG POLICY
“He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor
who boards ship without a rudder and compass and
never knows where he may cast” –
Leonardo da Vinci
Since the time of Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, political
scientists have developed theories intended to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of government. From the time when Harold Lasswell first introduced the
concept “policy science” in 1951 the concept has become a “growth industry” for
political scientists (Lasswell 85-104;Doron 303-09). The proliferation of
government programs in the 1960s and 1970s to address complex public
problems (i.e., poverty, equality, etc) created a need for more rigorous policy
analysis (McCool). While advances in technology made analysis of larger
datasets easier, the complexities of the new policy process continued to challenge
analysis (McCool). Analysis of the unlimited number of actors, variables, and
relationships involved in public policy proves a daunting task without an analytical
roadmap. It is the use of theoretical frameworks that assist in our quest to
understand the political phenomenon.
While many theoretical frameworks have materialized since Lasswell (1951),
innovation and diffusion policy theories have become dominant in exploring the
factors influencing state policy adoption. In this chapter, I will discuss the
theoretical framework of state policy innovation and diffusion, argue the theoretical
application to prescription drug policy, and identify the relevant factors for
considering the legislatures’ adoptions of state prescription drug policy.
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Theoretical Framework
While the social scientist Everett Rogers ([1962], 2003) is most often
associated with the diffusion of innovation theory, it was the early work of Walker
(1969) that brought innovation theory to political science. In his seminal work,
The Diffusion of Innovations Among States, Walker (1969, 881) defined
innovation as “a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no
matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted
it.” In his analysis of 88 various policies, Walker established that some states
were more expedient than other states in their policy adoption. Succeeding
Walker (1969), Gray (1973) concluded that while some states are faster to act
than other states, the diffusion pattern does vary by policy topic. Specifically,
Gray found that states quick to adopt education laws were not necessarily that
quick to adopt welfare or civil rights laws (1973, 1184).
Since the initial work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973), innovation theory
in political science has developed into two divergent methods of explanation.
The first approach focuses on the internal determinants (e.g., political
composition of legislation, unemployment rates, and public opinion) that affect
state policy innovation. Under the internal determinants model, a state’s internal
socioeconomic and political factors are examined to ascertain their influence on
state policy innovation (Sabatier). The supposition that states’ internal
characteristics are influential is founded on previous findings suggesting a
relationship between state policy innovation and state population, urbanization,
wealth, and industrialization (Walker, 1969, 851-861).
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At the heart of the second approach is the examination of external factors
(e.g., professional networks, influence of neighboring states, influence of federal
government) (Berry and Berry, 1990). Unlike the internal determinants model
which focuses on the economic, demographic, and political characteristics within
the state, the external determinants model explores the influence of political,
professional and financial dealings outside the state.
While the work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) focused on either the
internal or external factors effecting state policy, Berry and Berry’s (1990)
analysis of state lottery policy adoption incorporated both the internal and
external determinants in a combined theory. Berry and Berry (1990) created a
more inclusive analytical framework by employing Mohr’s theory (1969, 111).
Mohr indicated that public policy was a function of the “interaction among the
motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, and the
availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles”. In essence, Berry and
Berry (1990, 400) argue that the information gathered from neighboring states
assist in overcoming the obstacles or uncertainty associated with innovation.
Whether it is for reasons of competition or constraints, there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that states’ public policies are influenced by external forces.
Linking to Prescription Drug Policy
Prescription drug policy can be quite complex, both substantively and in
the policy making process. Although there are competing values, competing
issues, and competing solutions, a significant number of states have adopted, or
have attempted to adopt, prescription drug policies over the past decade
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(National Conference of State Legislatures 2009). This begs the question of
what factors influence state adoption of prescription drug policy. The detailed
discussion on varying factors affecting separate prescription drug policy construct
is an important contribution to the innovation and diffusion literature.
As previously mentioned, state prescription drug policy is best suited for
analysis using the policy innovation framework. Prior theory suggests multiple
structural factors (i.e., citizen need, capacity of the state to meet that need, and the
structure of the policy subsystem) influence state policy adoption (Walker 1969;
Gray 1973). While scholars have built upon the seminal work of Walker (1969)
and Gray (1973) in continued examination of factors contributing to the adoption or
attempted adoption of state policy, Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007) and Kingdon
(2003, 92) provide an organizational method for discussing the factors influencing
prescription drug policy. While Gray, Lowery and Godwin (2007) suggest four
possible constructs (structural conditions of the state, interest group influence,
public preferences on an innovation and political party influence), Kingdon’s theory
suggests examination of factors associated with the policy streams of problems,
policies, and politics. While this dissertation does not apply Kingdon’s theory in the
purest form, the use of Kingdon’s theory in conjunction with Gray, Lowery, and
Godwin (2007) provides a sound structure for examining the factors influencing
state prescription drug policy.
For the purpose of this analysis, structural conditions refer to the internal
factors indicating to state legislators that a problem exists; therefore, the first set of
factors discussed are those that indicate need for government intervention. So,
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how do state legislators become aware of citizen need and what means are
available to deal with it? As suggested by Kingdon’s assertion that indicators
assist in bringing attention to an issue, states with a disproportionate share of
subpopulations (i.e., elderly, poor, rural, and sick) associated with greater use of
pharmaceuticals may serve to demonstrate the necessity for government
intervention.
Second, state legislators must consider the states’ means to deal with the
issue. Kingdon suggests that the window of opportunity for policy adoption
increases when problems and politics are coupled with viable policy options.
Kingdon argues that the policy community in essence creates a short list of viable
policies that largely address the problem within the political confines (2003, 139).
Undoubtedly, the identification of viable policy options includes those that are
financially feasible. The popular catch phrase “Show me the money” from the
motion picture Jerry Maguire, seems befitting the situation. Similarly, state
legislators undoubtedly ask themselves “How are we going to pay for this?” Thus,
policies that address the funding questions undoubtedly influence the policy
options considered and those ultimately adopted.
Lastly, beyond demographic indicators, policy makers are also influenced
by what Kingdon construes as political factors (i.e., national mood, election results,
administrative and ideological changes, and interest groups). Kingdon (2003, 163)
denotes that these factors serve as indicators of pressure to either promote or
deter public policy. It is the effect of these political factors coupled with problem
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identification and viable policy options that must converge to create windows of
opportunity for policy adoption.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the factors thought to influence
state prescription drug policy adoption. The factors are presented in accordance
with the supposition identified in Kingdon and Gray, Lowery and Godwin. In
essence, the order in which I will discuss the factors include structural conditions,
state intrinsic characteristics, and external factors.
Demographic Conditions
States are comprised of a multitude of individuals with varying needs and
wants from their state legislator. State legislators must somehow ascertain the
needs of the citizens by whom they were elected. One such way is to examine the
structural conditions of the state. In other words, what is the situation of being
within the state? It seems plausible to expect state legislators to consider policies
that impact a significant portion of their population. It is my hypothesis that in the
case of prescription drug policy, the states’ population aspects of age, poverty,
education, urbanization, and health status serve as indicators to state legislators of
the need for government action.
State population over the age of 65: Research suggests that the age
distribution of citizens within a state may influence state policy adoption for two
reasons. First, researchers have substantiated the positive relationship between
age and utilization of health care services (e.g., prescription medications) with
older patients using more health services (Poisal et al. 2007; Roe and McNamara
2002). Thus states with a disproportionate share of citizens over the age of 65

Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 21
may have a greater need for pharmaceuticals. Not only are states with an older
population more likely to adopt prescription drug policies aimed at access but
states with a larger percentage of elderly are likely to be early adopters of health
care reform policy (Carter and LaPlant 1997, 23).
Second, research suggests a relationship between age and public policy.
Specifically, evidence suggests that those over the age of 65 are more supportive
of health policies that increase the government’s financial contribution to health
care costs (Weaver 610-19). Additionally, research indicates that the
subpopulation that would benefit from the legislation is more politically active
(Campbell 565-74). States with a larger proportion of the politically active elderly
have a greater likelihood to adopt generous prescription assistance programs
(Gray, Lowery, and Godwin, 2007, 97). State legislators may fear negative
reaction at the next election from what is commonly perceived to be the largest
voting community. Founded on the evidence that older patients have greater
utilization of prescription drugs and are more likely to be politically active, one
could easily suppose that the greater the states proportion of elderly the more
likely legislators to endorse prescription drug policies (Kaiser Family Foundation
2007).
Poverty: In addition to addressing the needs of the elderly subpopulation,
state legislators have adopted policies to address the health needs of the poor.
For example, in 2006 Massachusetts adopted legislation designed to provide
access to health insurance for all state residents (Blendon et al. 2008; Kaiser
Family Foundation 2009). Beyond health insurance, research indicates that
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states’ unemployment and poverty levels have been positively linked to Medicaid
enrollment and spending levels (Albin and Stein 1977; Carter and LaPlant 1997).
Additionally, literature suggests that public policy for a particular group is
influenced by the extent to which the citizen group needing assistance is
considered worthy (Grogan 1994). However, the fact that a significant number of
Americans across a wide variety of socioeconomic conditions have difficulties
paying for prescription drugs may mitigate the resistance to assist the “unworthy”
amidst the breadth of citizens needing assistance. Conventional wisdom suggests
that citizen income would likely influence the individual’s ability to purchase
prescription medications. I hypothesize that states with a disproportionate
population in poverty may have a greater likelihood to adopt prescription drug
policy aimed at acquisition and safety. On the contrary, I hypothesize that
adoption of distribution policies which target the pharmaceutical distribution entities
are unlikely to be influenced by the proportion of state citizenry in poverty.
Education: A disproportionate population of less educated citizens may
have an effect on prescription drug policy for reasons similar to those of the elderly
and poverty subpopulations. Education may serve as an indicator of need.
Evidence suggests that education is positively associated with better health
outcomes. As anyone who has tried to navigate the U.S. health care system
quickly finds, health care is a complex issue. Research indicates that individuals
enrolled in educational programs have better health outcomes (Bunting and
Cranor 2006; Cranor, Bunting, and Christensen 2003). Specifically, education is a
predictor of good health (Pincus et al. 1998, Daniels 2001). Even when controlling
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for age, ethnicity, and gender, individuals who fail to complete high school are
more likely to develop chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes, cardiovascular) (Pincus et
al. 1998). While little evidence links education level to utilization of prescription
medications, one could suppose that the education of an individual would be
correlated to his or her knowledge and understanding of the disease. Scholars
argue that states with a greater proportion of high school graduates were more
concerned with health risks (Shipman and Volden 840-57). Thus states with a less
educated population may have a greater need for government intervention.
Urbanization: The evidence suggests that states with unbalanced rural and
urban populations vary in their needs. Specifically related to health care services,
scholars argue that urban and regional differences exist in the need, utilization,
access, and legislator sophistication (Holahan, Berenson, and Kacavos 1990;
Casey 2001). At an early age, we discover cultural differences between rural and
urban areas by reading Aesop’s Fable, Country Mouse City Mouse. Beyond
fictional depictions of cultural differences, scholars have found the rural and urban
variation in utilization of services (e.g., child care and municipal services) and
public policy (Walker 1969, McMillan and Amoako-Tuffour 1991).
According to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, over 50 million Americans live
in nonmetropolitan areas. Individuals living in rural areas are associated with a
greater need for services as they are older, sicker, and poorer (Ormond,
Zuckerman, and Lhila 2000). In addition to need, access to care varies regionally.
The National Rural Health Association states that in spite of 20% of Americans
living in rural areas only 10% of physicians practice in rural areas. In terms of
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prescription drug policy, access to physicians has a direct link to access to
prescription drugs in that patients are unable to secure prescription medications
without approval of a physician. Those in urban areas have greater access to
health care providers and pharmacies, thus influencing their ability to get
prescription medications.
Beyond the influence of needs and access, research suggests that regional
differences are associated with legislator sophistication, indicating a positive
relationship between state urbanization and policy adoption (Walker 1969). Based
on the supposition that legislators from urban areas are more sophisticated and
thus more likely to be policy innovators, scholars suggest that urbanization
influences policy adoption. In the case of prescription drug policy, I concur that
urbanization will influence state prescription policy, however, contrary to Walker, I
posit the influence is based on citizen representation of need rather than the
legislator sophistication. It is important to note that for the purpose of my
dissertation urbanization refers to the metropolitan (e.g., cities and surrounding
suburbs). Thus, I suggest that the greater the proportion of the population living in
rural areas, the greater the influence on state prescription drug policy adoption.
Health status: Similar to the aforementioned factors, health status may
serve as an indicator of need. Although one might intuitively expect patients in
poorer health to use more medication, scholars have empirically substantiated the
finding that those in poor health status will consume more, regardless of insurance
type (Poisal and Murray 2001). The research suggests that patients in poor health
have less price sensitivity to needed medications than those with better health
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status (Remler and Atherly 2003). In essence, patients with poor health have
greater need and are less sensitive to changes in prescriptions drug costs.
However, as prescription drug costs continue to rise, the acquisition of prescription
medications becomes more challenging. Undoubtedly, state legislatures have an
interest in assisting residents with access to prescription medications. While, I
hypothesize that the health status of a states’ citizenry may influence the adoption
of access and safety prescription drug policies, I can find no evidence to suggest
that the health status would affect the adoption of distribution policies. As
previously mentioned, distribution policies attempt to regulate the entities involved
in distribution not address the needs of one segment of the population.
Institutional Characteristics
State Financial Capacity: Unlike the factors mentioned up to this point
which serve as indicators of need, this factor provides an indicator of the states’
financial capability. The early work of Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) found that
wealthy states had more resources with which to explore policy options and
therefore, were more innovative than poor states. Additionally, scholars have
found that resources affect policy adoption changes (Bingham 1976; Downs 1976;
Downs and Mohr 1980; Mohr 1969; Walker 1969). In his analysis of policies
mandating Medicaid recipients to enroll in managed care plans, Satterwaite (2002)
found consistent results that poor states were less likely to adopt such policies.
Berry and Berry (1990, 411) found states with “poor fiscal health” were more likely
to adopt lottery policy. Unlike the lottery policy, which would bring revenue into the
state and thus would more likely be adopted by states facing financial difficulty,
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prescription drug policy aimed at providing prescription drugs to citizens would
incorporate financial outlays and thus would more likely be adopted by wealthier
states. With regard to state pharmacy assistance programs, Gray, Lowery, and
Godwin (2007, 115) found wealth of a state to be positively associated with
adopting prescription drug assistance programs.
Many states provide access to prescription medications either through the
Medicaid program or with separate state-funding programs. Providing such
assistance to citizens can be quite expensive. In 2006, states funded 7% of
prescription medications via public assistance programs (i.e., Medicaid, SCHIP,
and General Assistance), worker’s compensation, and temporary disability
(National Health Expenditure). Undoubtedly, state budgets affect the ability to pay
for such things as prescription drugs. In general, states have the option to either
reduce spending or increase taxes to pay for such policies. State legislators are
keenly aware of the political implications of tax increases. Therefore, I posit that
the wealthier a state, the greater the likelihood of adopting prescription drug
access policies.
Legislative Professionalism. Similar to state wealth, the degree of
professional resources (e.g., skill, knowledge, and staff) serve as an indicator of a
states capacity to address the complex issue of prescription drug policy. The
1960s reform movement to increase legislative professionalism resulted in a
significant increase in staff, higher legislative salaries, and longer session length
by the 1980s (King 2000; Rosenthal 1996; Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations 1985, 364). Scholars have found that increased
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professionalism has had a positive impact on winning elections, citizen contact,
and initiatives among legislators (Rosenthal 1996, Berry, Berkman, and
Schneiderman 2000; Grossback and Peterson, 2004). The extent to which longer
sessions and increased staff have permitted legislators to gain a significant
understanding of the policy issue may have the potential to influence other
legislators. In essence, legislative experts provide information and influence other
legislators with internal knowledge and are regarded as “trusted sources” by
colleagues (Dahl 2005 [1950]). As previously stated, prescription drug policy is a
complex system involving economic, scientific, and financial constructs benefiting
from the additional staff and session length to navigate and develop an
understanding of the policy issue. To the extent that staffing and length of session
have a positive effect on understanding a complex policy, one would reason that
having session time and personnel available would also positively affect state
prescription drug policy adoption.
Neighboring States. Conventional wisdom suggests that we are
influenced by the things around us. Scholars suggest this may also apply to
state influences on other states (Walker 1969). The argument rests on the idea
that external factors on state policy adoption are a consequence of constraints
and competition. One of the most difficult challenges for any legislator is to figure
out the best solution to an issue based on limited and often imperfect information.
While rational choice theory suggests that decisions are based on complete
knowledge surrounding the problem and potential solutions, as human beings,
state legislators have significant limitations on what they can grasp, process, and
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base a decision on (Lindblom 79-88;Lindblom 79-88;Kingdon vii-253;Lindblom
79-88;Sabatier). Legislators, like many Americans, operate in an environment
where our actions are a consequence of time, physical, mental, and political
constraints. In part because of the limited time and resources to consider all
possible options, state legislators may borrow from an already successful policy
(Walker, 1969). A policy that has been “tried and true” in another state may
appear to have reduced risk and thus be more appealing to state legislators.
State legislators may address the internal political and social constraints by
looking to states with similar social and political characteristics (Boehmke and
Witmer 39-51).
In today’s environment of technological and communication
advancements, state legislators have access to an abundance of policy
information related to the policy actions of other states. For example, media
markets often service more than one state. As a result, states may receive
information on public policy initiatives being conducted by their neighboring state.
In addition, state legislators may rely on personal and professional contacts for
guidance on state policy. Scholars argue that the presence of media and
professional networks allow for opportunity for policy leaders to gain knowledge
about policies and their likelihood of success (Carter and LaPlant 17-26).
Furthermore, scholars argue that emulation of successful policies may occur
outside of neighboring states (Karch 2007). Specifically, legislators may also
become aware of successful policy options through membership in professional
organizations and attendance at professional conferences. In addition to
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knowledge of successful policies, research has indicated participation in
professional organizations positively influences policy adoption. In his 2001
analysis of Health Maintenance Organizations, Balla (2001) found that states
whose insurance commissioner was involved in the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners were more likely to adopt the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) Model Act.
In addition to the physical, mental, and political constraints, “competitive
federalism” may influence state policy adoption (Tiebout 1956). States
sometimes compete with one another for an advantage on economic
development and to avoid being at a disadvantage on items such as welfare
benefits (Grogan 1994, 593, Karch 2007, 62). The similarities across states with
regard to law, politics, language, and culture make movement between states
easier for business. Couple the ease of relocation with the financial benefits
business provides to states, one can easily see why states engage in bidding
wars to persuade business to locate in their state (Grady 1987). States also
incentivize business and labor through lower tax rates as evidenced by research
reporting a positive correlation between relocation rates of citizen and business
and the tax to service ratio of states (Tiebout 1956).
In addition to competing for business and labor, states also face
competition with regard to lost revenue. In their seminal work, Berry and Berry
(1990) posit that out of fear of losing revenue, states considering lotteries were
influenced by whether or not neighboring states had lotteries. Scholars have
also found similar results that economic competition positively influences Indian
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gaming policy adoption (Boehmke and Witmer 2004). In both cases, the
evidence suggests that state lawmakers may experience pressure to emulate
public policy or face negative consequences (e.g., loss of jobs and revenue).
States may also compete in policy adoption to avoid being attractive to unwanted
entities (e.g., welfare recipients) (Peterson, and Rom 1990)2. While the evidence
suggests a seemingly consistent finding that competitive federalism influences
state policy adoption, Berry and Baybeck (2005) indicate that states may
compete on issues such as state lottery but not on the issue of welfare benefits,
thus suggesting that the influence of competition varies by policy issue.
Additionally, on the issue of pharmacy assistance programs, Grogan (1994)
presents evidence suggesting the neighboring effect to be nil on actual policy
adoption yet have a negative effect on program generosity and a positive effect
on program expansion.
The research literature has suggested that the policy adoption of other
states may influence state policy adoption. In the case of prescription drug
policy, I speculate this to be the case, particularly on the issue of acquisition and
distribution. While state legislators may be more influenced by competitive
federalism on the issue of distribution, on the issue of prescription drug policies
aimed at acquisition, state legislators may look to other states for both reasons of
emulation and competition.
Interest Group Influence

2

Scholars have challenged this supposition on the basis of methodological design flaws including
failure to adjust for inflation (Volden, 2002, 353).
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According to E.E. Schattschneider (1986, 247), “The diet on which the
American leviathan feeds is something more than a jungle of disparate special
needs.” While most individuals, not just the political scientists, are aware of the
escalating number of interest groups since the 1960s and 1970s, it is political
scientists who have explored the influence of interest groups (Walker, 1983;
Berry, 1987, Baumgartner and Leech, 2001, Yackee and Yackee, 2006). In
general, the research indicates that business interest groups are prolific in
politics and that they are influential in policymaking (Baumgartner and Leech
2001; Yackee and Yackee 2006). In 2002, of the 17,880 registered lobbyists in
Washington DC, 40% indicate advocating for a health care issue. In other words,
there were 13 health care lobbyists for every member in the U.S. Congress.
(Glabman 2002). Prescription drug policy is no different than other health policy
issues in regard to the breadth and depth of interest groups. To illustrate
Schattschneider’s point of diverse interests, one need only look at the issue of
prescription drug policy at the federal level where the involvement of
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), AARP,
American Hospital Association (AHA) American Association of Health Plans
(AAHP), American Medical Association (AMA), U.S. Chamber of Commerce was
present (Oliver, Lee, and Lipton, 2004; Weissert and Weissert 2006). It has been
suggested that the more than 400 pages of MMA legislation was significantly
influenced by lobbyists (Hall and Van Houweling 2006).
While legislators face considerable political pressure from a myriad of
health care interests, according to some scholars, interest groups provide an
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indispensable service through their willingness to provide information and
campaign support (Dahl 1961; Kingdon 2003; Lindblom 1959; Weissert and
Weissert 2006). Policy innovation commands labor resources necessary to
research policy options and correlated costs (Mohr 1969). Lobbyists can employ
techniques of testifying at legislative hearings, meeting personally, and doing
favors to affect what the government does (Nownes 2006, 17). Additionally, the
willingness to write letters, make calls, etc. can potentially get the attention of
government officials (Heaney 2006, 891). Scholars argue that the interest group
engagement in the political process can have an effect on the government’s
agenda (Kingdon 2003). While the evidence suggests that interest groups are
influential in public policy, scholars have argued that interest groups tend to favor
business (Schattschneider 1986). However, Grogan (1994) suggests that
influence of business and provider may be greater when the public interest is
low.
The interest groups most commonly associated with prescription drug
policy are those representing drug manufacturers. Groups representing health
service providers (e.g., Illinois Pharmacist Association) and groups representing
patients (e.g., National AIDS Foundation) are also active prescription drug policy.
For example, the National AIDS Foundation website indicates advocating
expansion of access to Narcan a useful to reverse the onset of overdose (Aids
Foundation of Chicago). Whereas, the Illinois Pharmacist Association website
indicates their mission is “dedicated to enhancing the professional competency of
pharmacists, advancing the standards of pharmacy practice, improving
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pharmacists’ effectiveness in assuring rational drug use in society, and leading in
the resolution of public policy issues affecting pharmacists” (Illinois Pharmacists
Association)
At the state level, research indicates that advocacy organizations can
have a strong positive effect on health policy (Miller 2007; Pracht and Moore
2003). Grogan (1994) found that the pressure exerted by interest groups
affected state Medicaid policy decisions. While Gray, Lowery, and Godwin
(2007) argue that the effect may be greater on the policy revisions as opposed to
policy adoption, interest groups such as the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) have been successful in stopping or at least
delaying policy adoption. In the case of preferred drug lists and Medicaid
discounts, PhRMA filed lawsuits in Michigan, Florida, and Maine to challenge
state legislation. This same group was also successful in restricting the
importation of prescription medications from Canada (Silow-Carroll and Alteras
2004). The impact of interest groups state policy adoption may be reflective of
the sheer magnitude of contacts at a state level compared to that at a national
level.
Consistent with research literature, I hypothesize adoption of state
prescription drug policy will be influenced by the involvement of interest groups.
In particular, state regulatory policies aimed at distribution of prescription drugs
will be of particular interest to those representing the distributive entities.
Similarly, state legislation related to acquisition and safety of prescription
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medications is of particular interest to the entities representing the patients and
providers.

Public Preference
Issue Salience: Scholars have long since recognized that issues matter.
The seminal work on Congress found that legislator actions are different for issues
that get local or national attention compared to issues that are not (Mayhew 1974;
Fenno 1978). Additionally, research indicates that issues of broad public concern
affect public policy in terms of attention, timing, and type (Dahl 1969; Key 1961).
Americans face many challenges in their day to day lives; however, it is the
movement from a personal challenge to a public distress that increases the
salience of an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 27; Northington, Gamble and
Stone 2006). Kingdon suggests that problems that violate our societal values are
likely to be construed as a problem needing attention (2003, 198). The strongest
of those values include equity, individual responsibility, and faith in market
solutions. As demonstrated in the latest public discourse over health care reform,
perception of inequitable distribution of health care resources has moved the issue
from an individual problem to a government problem.
Momentous issues that resonate with the public will undoubtedly gain
greater legislative attention than issues with minimal interest which will quickly
dissipate from the public agenda (Weissert and Weissert 2006, 333). At the
national level, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 illustrated how the salience
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of an issue can factor into policy adoption. The rising costs of prescription
medications, a critical issue for seniors (a major voting bloc), became an important
matter for legislators. Additionally, it has been suggested that the saliency of
issues may be stronger if they can be associated to a “villain” (Downs 1972). In
the case of prescription drug policy, the issue of rising drug costs is often
associated with the “villainous” entities that are pharmaceutical manufacturers and
insurance companies.
Additionally, issues that are perceived as critical will impact the timing and
type of public policy. For salient issues that are perceived as critical, citizens
expect immediate attention and appear comfortable in leaving the specific policy
details to the experts. At the national level, prescription drug policy has a long
standing practice of materializing subsequent to triggering events (Grabowski and
Vernon 1983). For example, each of the three defining periods of the Food and
Drug Administration regulatory policies resulted from a triggering event. The first
period is demarcated by the actions of muckrakers like Samuel Hopkins Adams
and Upton Sinclair. Subsequent to their expose’, industry, legislators, and the
general public got behind food and drug regulation, eventually passing the 1906
Pure Food and Drug Act (Hilts 2003, 51). The article written by Samuel Hopkins
Adams in Collier’s revealed the levels of acetanilide in Cuforhedake Brane-Fude
was responsible for at least twenty-two deaths; these revelations subsequently
mobilized public concern.3 While this remedy was, as the name implies, aimed at
reducing headaches, it was comprised of alcohol, caffeine, and acetanilide4.

3
4

Most of the historical accounts of FDA are from Hilts 2003.
Acetanilide was commonly used as a pain reliever but was later found to be related to blood disorders.
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Although the previous triggering events resulted in legislation, journalists,
consumer protection groups and even the FDA itself indicated a need for
additional legislation to address gaps in the 1906 law. However, it was not until a
cataclysmic event involving the death of more than 100 individuals took place that
public policy was adopted. The details surrounding the event included the
Massengill Company of Tennessee, which developed and sold a product for
children that contained a chemical similar to antifreeze. One of the gaps of the
1906 Act was that food and drugs did not have to be tested for safety (U.S. Food
and Drug Administration). The tragedies of the 1930s rallied support for a change
to food and drug law. Shortly after the catastrophic event, Roosevelt signed the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) into law.
As clearly demonstrated by events surrounding FDA policies and health
care reform, cost, safety, and distribution of prescription medications are concerns
that resonate with citizens. In essence, the “government does what the people
want in those instances where the public cares enough about an issue to make its
wishes known” (Wright, Erickson, McIver 1987, 981). Therefore, I hypothesize that
issue saliency positively affects the adoption of prescription drug policy.
Political Influence
Ideology: To the extent that the goal of elected officials is to gain as much
public support as possible in hopes of getting reelected, policies that are consistent
with prevailing beliefs or values of the citizens are more likely to be adopted than
when those beliefs are threatened (Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek 1973).
Generally speaking, citizen beliefs and values are manifested through association
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as either conservative or liberal. Mohr (1969) identifies ideology as a motivating
factor in the construction of public policy. Scholars suggest that within a state it is
the public identification as liberal or conservative that impacts policymaking;
superseding the effect of the demographic factors (i.e., age, poverty, education,
urbanization, and wealth) (Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1987). For example, those
states supporting civil rights and health policy are most commonly associated with
liberal ideology. The innovation of public policy is believed to occur more
frequently in states with liberal ideology because of their willingness to bring more
issues to the table and their openness to experimentation (Nice, 1984). On the
issue of health care policy, several scholars deem ideology to be a significant
influence (Starr 1982; Marmor 2000; Miller 2005).
Based on the literature research, I argue that states with a disproportionate
liberal citizenry will be more likely to adopt acquisition, distributive and safety
policies than those with a conservative ideology. As indicated earlier, assisting
with access to prescription medications is a redistributive policy in that it requires
taxpayers to subsidize the medical care of those in need. Additionally, the
regulatory nature of acquisition, safety, and distribution policies challenges our
societal belief of reliance on the market solutions and laissez-faire approach.
Thus, I hypothesize that those states with a more liberal ideology will be more
likely to adopt
Political Party Control: Both in terms of public policy and government elections,
political parties have undoubtedly played a fundamental role in the United States.
From America’s infancy, the utility of political parties was quite apparent
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particularly to people such as Thomas Jefferson, who revealed in a letter to Henry
Lee (1824) that “they (political parties) are censors of the conduct of each other
and useful watchmen for the public." In addition to serving as a watchful eye,
political parties simplify the political choice in terms of candidates and policies
(Nivola and Rosenbloom 1986). Through the political primary process, political
parties abridge the list of potential candidates.

Beyond safeguarding against

abuses by the other party and condensing the pool of political candidate, political
party ideology, issue selection, and committee staffing have been linked to policy
adoption.
According to Erikson (1971), political party made a difference in adoption
of progressive civil rights legislation; states with Republican or divided control
were less likely than nonsouthern states with Democratic control of both the
legislature and the governorship to adopt progressive civil rights legislation. At a
national level, one of the most significant prescription drug policies (i.e., MMA
2003) was passed under a Republican Congress and Republican President;
however state level analysis suggests that Democratic states are more likely to
support distributive policies than those aimed at regulating business. To the
extent that the state prescription drug policies are redistributive or regulatory, I
posit the less likely to be supported by states with Republican controlled
legislatures.
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Chapter Summary
It is no surprise that cost and access are challenges to the U.S. health
system. Equally well known is the fact that policymakers have spent the better
part of 80 years attempting reform to address the various challenges to our health
care system. At the state level, lawmakers have adopted or attempted to adopt
policies to address the cost and access of prescription drug policies. However,
variation in policy adoption of prescription drugs is as varied as the states
themselves. By utilizing innovation and diffusion theory, one can gain a better
understanding of the factors affecting prescription drug policy.
As presented in this chapter, the literature research suggests that state
policy adoption of state prescription drugs is influenced by the population
composition, financial capability, legislative professionalism, neighboring states,
interest groups, issue saliency, ideology, political party, and political control. Table
1 identifies the influential factors and their hypothesized influence which will be
further discussed in Chapter 6. Through the use of innovation and diffusion theory
one can explore the phenomenon of state prescription drug policy. More
specifically, one can identify and examine the factors that influence acquisition,
safety and distribution policies.
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Factor

Acquisition
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Safety
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Distribution
0
0
+
0
0
0
+

Age
Poverty
Education
Urbanization
Health Status
State Wealth
Legislative
Professionalism
Neighboring State
+
+
+
Policy Adoption
Interest Group
+
0
+
Influence
Issue Salience
+
+
+
Political Ideology
+
+
+
Political Control
+
0
+
Table 1: Factors Influencing State Prescription Drug Policies
This table highlights the hypothesized effect of each factor on the prescription drug
policy classification. A plus sign indicates a positive effect on state prescription
drug policy. A zero indicates no effect on state prescription drug policy adoptions.
A negative sign indicates a negative effect on state prescription drug policy.
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CHAPTER 3: STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY: ACQUISITION
What can be added to the happiness of man who is in health, out of
debt, and has a clear conscience?- Adam Smith
For some individuals, the growing expense of prescription medications has
made it difficult to attain the happiness described by Adam Smith. In fact, patients
have been forced to modify their utilization of prescription medications, perhaps
sacrificing health to avoid debt (Cunningham, Miller, and Cassil 2008). Beyond the
individual, states are reeling from the economic pinch as well. State and local
government prescription drug costs exceeded $200 billion in 2005 compared to
only $3.7 million in 1960, prior to the adoption of Medicare and Medicaid (Center
for Medicaid and Medicare Services 2008).5 Price inflation, therapeutic drug mix,
newer more costly medications, and increased utilization all contribute to the
increased cost of prescription medications (Express Scripts Drug Trend Report
2007). Out of necessity, states have had to be innovative in terms of how to pay
for prescription medications. The legislative approaches to prescription drug policy
are as different as the states themselves. Thus, in order to determine the factors
influencing prescription drug policy, one must closely examine the policies.
As mentioned above, the past ten years have produced a multitude of state
prescription drug policies, coalescing around the three general constructs of
acquisition, safety, and distribution. For the purpose of this analysis, acquisition
policies are defined as those that rely on financial mechanisms, use state dollars to
assist citizens with access to prescription medication, or policies that utilize
institutions to maximize access. In particular, acquisition policies include
5

Not adjusted for inflation.
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legislation related to Medicaid and Medicare. While current provisions within
Medicare and Medicaid provide some resources to assist the poor and elderly with
the acquisition of prescription medications, state legislators have adopted policies
to maximize the utility of these programs. For example, states have adopted
legislation to take advantage of federally negotiated pricing for prescription
medications.
Additionally, acquisition policies included legislation that employ economic
principles of supply and demand. The United States has a long standing tradition
of reliance on market solutions to address public problems, and state prescription
drug policy is no exception. While policy specifics vary, state policies intended to
expand access to prescription medications have generally been based on the
economic theory of supply and demand. In general, state legislators employ two
policy approaches: one aimed at the price of prescriptions and the other aimed at
the quantity demanded. Policies intended to affect the price utilize a myriad of
strategies including maximization of purchasing power, price controls, and other
financial incentives. On the demand side, states’ have utilized incentives to
encourage patients to demand the equally efficacious affordable options. In
essence, state legislators hope to increase access to needed prescription
medications by reducing the financial barriers patients confront.
Table 2 is a list of the eight policies selected from the National Council of
State Legislatures and included in the acquisition classification. Only legislation
designed to increase access through a policy associated with Medicare or
Medicaid, those policies attempting to intercede on the price or quantity of
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prescription medications, or utilized institutions to maximize access were included
in the acquisition classification. It is my supposition that the summative
categorization of acquisition policies allows for a more parsimonious analysis of
the factors influencing prescription drug policies. Chapter six describes the
methodological approach to categorization. During my analytical time period,
executive orders related to prescription drug policy did occur; however, state
legislative actions are the focus of this analysis. Although each state may not be
specifically mentioned, each of the various access policies adopted by states over
the past decade will be discussed in this chapter. While this chapter independently
presents the policies used by states to increase access to prescription
medications, many of these approaches are used in conjunction with one another.
It is this combination of approaches within one policy that further supports my
analytical approach to examine factors that affect access prescription drug
policies. For example, many of the states will have both a brand and generic
component within the same policy.
Name of Acquisition Prescription Drug Policies
Expand use of 340B drug discount price program
Bulk Purchasing
Rx discount programs
Medicare Prescription Drug Act(MMA)
State Rx subsidy program
Importation
Tax deductions
Preferred Drug List
Generic drug use
Access to brand name pharmaceutical products
Table 2: Types of Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies
This table presents the prescription drug policies identified as Acquisition.
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Price-Side Approaches
Expanded use of 340b drug discount price program
One of the prominent mediums by which states provide access to
prescriptions is through the federal entitlement program, Medicaid. Established in
the 1960s as a way to assist the poor in accessing health care, Medicaid is a
program that grants states liberty in design and administration within the broad
general guidelines of the federal government. States have authority in setting
eligibility criteria and benefits. In 2007, the total Medicaid outlay was $333.2 billion
with the federal government paying about 57% to finance health care for
approximately 49.1 million people (Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services,
2008; Kaiser Family Foundation 2009). Medicaid provides a safety net by funding
health care for one in five Americans. During economic downturns, when states
face additional demand for assistance and a decrease in revenue stream,
providing assistance becomes particularly problematic.
In reaction to financial pressure, states have explored many viable options
to reduce prescription drug costs. One possible solution has come at the hands of
the federal government. Under the expansion of the 340b Drug Pricing Program,
states are able to secure reduced pricing for prescription medications (Mertz
2007). According to the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program under the Omnibus
Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990), manufacturers are required
to afford drug rebates to State Medicaid agencies. Subsequent to OBRA 1990,
the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 established the 340b Drug Pricing Program
of 1992, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
which required manufacturers to limit the cost of covered outpatient drugs for
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federally qualified health centers. Specifically within the DHHS, the program is
administered by the Pharmacy Affairs Branch (PAB) of the Bureau of Primary
Health Care. So how does a country that reveres freedom of the market get an
industry with one of the most influential interest groups to agree to limit its prices?
While participation was voluntary, manufacturers who failed to participate would
not receive the federal Medicaid matching funds as stipulated under the Medicaid
Program (Health Resources and Services Administration 2009).
In an opportunity to reduce the costs of prescriptions paid by governmental
entities, state agencies and counties were authorized, and encouraged, to search
for opportunities to utilize the 340b pricing. Table 3 presents the type of entities
that are considered appropriate federally-qualified health centers. Given that the
340b program was established in 1992, all states had adopted the initial program;
however, economic pressure and increased demand for Medicaid assistance have
forced states to expand their use of the 340b program. Undoubtedly, the push for
greater participation in the 340b program resulted from financial pressure; the
1998 DHHS audit highlighted the underutilization of the program (Brown, 1998).
According to the 1998 audit, two-thirds of eligible HRSA grantees did not
participate, thus leaving money on the table.
Over the past decade a number of states have adopted legislation to
expand the use of 340b within their states. In general, state expansion has
entailed legislative action mandating state agencies participate or encourage
education about the benefits of the 340b program. While states like Maine and
New Hampshire have adopted legislation mandating state agencies explore the
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increased use of 340b program for many diseases, other states like Utah have
targeted specific diseases such as hemophilia. The results have been significant
with states like Rhode Island (Heinz Foundation Report) reporting $2 million dollars
in savings the first year and other states reporting between 20% to 50% off of
Average Wholesale Price6 (Scholz 2008).

6

Average Wholesale Price is defined as the national price by Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services
regulation (42 C.F.R §405.517).

Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 47

Types of Entities Eligible
Disproportionate share hospitals
Family planning projects
Community health centers
Federally Qualified Health Center Look-Alikes (FQHCLA)
Migrant health centers
Section 340S school-based programs
Health centers for residents of public housing
Health centers for the homeless
Tribal contract clinics
State-operated AIDS drug assistance programs (ADAPs)
Black lung clinics
Comprehensive hemophilia diagnostic treatment centers
Native Hawaiian health centers
Urban Indian organizations
Entities receiving assistance under the Ryan White Care Act
Sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics
Tuberculosis (TB) clinics
Table 3: Entities Eligible to Participate in the 340b Drug Price Program
This table presents the entities approved to apply for participation in the 340b Drug
Price Program administered by DHHS. Source: PL 102-585 Section 602.
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Bulk Purchasing
In addition to exploring prospects presented at the federal level, states have
looked within and across borders for opportunities. The result is that states have
entered into intragovernmental or intergovernmental state purchasing agreements.
In essence, these purchasing pool arrangements allow states to combine their
orders and buy in bulk, thereby obtaining a reduced purchase rate and increased
rebates for prescription medications. While some states have entered into these
arrangements to reduce the prescription medication costs related to Medicaid,
other states have entered into these arrangements for all prescription medications
purchased by the state regardless of group (e.g., state employees and SCHIP).
Intragovernmental purchasing pools like the one in the state of Georgia created the
Department of Community Health (DCH) to oversee the purchasing of prescription
drugs for the entire state. The DCH negotiates on the behalf of state agencies to
facilitate the best prescription drug purchase price (Krause 2004). On the other
hand, states like Delaware, Missouri, New Mexico, and West Virginia have formed
the intergovernmental purchasing group RXIS. Under RXIS, the states utilize the
services of a Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) to negotiate with pharmaceutical
manufacturers for greater drug discounts. The multi-state pooled purchasing
reported substantial savings from the better negotiated price (Krause 2004). While
pooled purchasing arrangements offer significant benefits in terms of cost and
pharmacy management, they also present states with significant managerial and
political challenges (National Governors Association 2004). In order to optimize
the savings and strengthen their bargaining power, states need to develop similar
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lists of covered medication7. In doing so, the state is pushing market share to a
particular product, therefore, maximizing the savings. Developing a multi-state
coalition requires the political prowess necessary to navigate through the logistical
challenges associated with such an endeavor.
Prescription Drug Discount Programs
The variety of prescription drug discount programs is almost as varied as the
states themselves; however, the objective is consistent. State legislators are
exploring opportunities to reduce the prescription drug costs facing their
constituents of which drug discount programs have become one such method.
While Medicaid provides a safety net for many, there are many Americans who
exceed the financial qualifications for Medicaid but still have difficulty paying the
high price of prescription medications. In an effort to assist these individuals,
states like Maine, Illinois, Hawaii, and Iowa have negotiated with pharmaceutical
manufacturers to create drug discount programs. Patients who are not eligible for
Medicaid may enroll in these programs and receive discounts on their medications.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2009), half of all states
offer some form of prescription drug discount programs. While multiple states
have drug discount programs, the eligibility requirements and estimated discounts
vary by state. For example, Maine residents who meet income requirements may
enroll in the discount program, Maine Rx, to save 15% on branded medication and
60% on generic medications (State of Maine, 2009). On the other hand,
Colorado’s Cares Rx program negotiated with pharmacies to offer residents, who
do not have health insurance but do meet the financial necessity criteria,
7

Preferred Drug Lists are discussed later in this chapter.
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prescription medications at a fixed price for individuals (State of Colorado, 2009).
Similarly, Iowa’s Drug Card program has negotiated with pharmacies to offer
savings between 30 to 70%; however, the Iowa program has no income or
insurance requirement (Iowa Drug Card Program, 2009).
While drug discount programs have significant benefits to citizens in terms of
dollars, not everyone has been supportive of the programs. In the case of Maine,
PhRMA challenged that the state was in violation of interstate commerce and
harmful to Medicaid recipients (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America v.Walsh, 2003). Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the court ruled in
favor of Maine, stating that neither undue harm nor violation of interstate
commerce had occurred (Reforming States Group, 2003).
Medicare Modernization Act
On December 8, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law one of the
largest Medicare changes. Simply stated, the Medicare and Modernization Act of
2003 (also referred to as MMA or Part D) was designed to provide prescription
drug coverage for Medicare enrollees (CMS PL108-173 summary). With the
passage of MMA, Medicare eligible citizens had access to prescription drugs. Prior
to the passage of MMA, Medicare beneficiaries could purchase supplemental
insurance coverage that covered prescription medications or, if eligible, enroll in
Medicaid. However, the legislation resulted in more than 400 pages detailing a
complex policy. While the legislation was signed in 2003, the program was
phased in with the federal government offering a drug discount program beginning
in 2005 and going into full effect in 2006. In 2005, Medicare enrollees could sign
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up for a drug discount program similar to the states’ plans previously discussed but
at the federal level. In 2006, Medicare enrollees were able to enroll in Part D
plans.
In response to MMA, states began crafting legislation to deal with issues
brought about by MMA. In particular, the states developed policies to address the
immediate needs of dual-eligibles.8 According to NCSL, 37 states adopted policies
to temporarily assist dual-eligibles in the acquisition of prescription medications
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 Prescription Drug State
Legislation). While most of the state legislation occurred in the 2006, states have
continued to produce legislation to address MMA dilemmas.
State Subsidy
While the passage of MMA resulted in access to prescription medications for
seniors, it was not comprehensive. Members enrolled in Medicare Part D are still
responsible for deductibles and copayments, thereby influencing their ability to
purchase prescription medications. Often termed “wrap arounds,” the subsidy
programs pay the premiums, deductibles, and copayments associated with
prescription medications for Medicare enrollees who meet financial eligibility
requirements. Similar to the drug discount programs, the criteria and coverage
vary by state. Most states’ pharmacy assistance plans (SPAPs) pay for
deductibles, copays, and pharmaceuticals of those residents who do not reach a
percentage of federal poverty level. For example, the state of Hawaii program has

8

According to the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services website dual-eligible is defined as
“individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A and/or Part B and are eligible for some form of Medicaid
benefit.” Definition available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DualEligible/
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limited benefits to individuals who have an income of up to 100% of the federal
poverty level. A number of states, such as New York, Illinois, Hawaii, and Indiana,
have adopted these Medicare wrap around policies. States like Delaware and
Indiana have placed an annual subsidy limit per senior. According to Arizona’s
website, the copayment subsidy provided to seniors will be the latest casualty in
the current economic crisis. As of February 2009, Arizona dual-eligible citizens will
no longer be receiving financial assistance with prescription drug copayments.
Importation
In addition to domestic opportunities to save money, states have looked to
international opportunities for discounted medications. While the reimportation of
prescription medications is in violation of the United States Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, in 2004, the state of Illinois developed a program whereby
citizens could order a 90 day refill of their branded medications from Canada,
United Kingdom, and Ireland. Under the I-Save Rx program, the state of Illinois
contracted with CanaRx, a Canadian Pharmacy Benefit Manager, to allow
residents the opportunity to purchase prescription medications at a lower cost.
Use of the program is limited to patients who have already received their initial
prescription medications in the U.S. and limited to certain brand medications.
Generic medications, narcotics, and prescriptions requiring special handling such
as refrigeration are not available through this program. According to a press
release, the citizens of Illinois have saved 25% to 50% on 13,778 submitted
prescription drug orders (State of Illinois, 2006). States like Kansas, Wisconsin,
Missouri and Vermont have joined the I-Save Rx program. While the program
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offers the potential for significant savings, citizen use has been lower than
anticipated for a couple reasons (State of Illinois Office of the Auditor General,
2008). First, physicians argue safety concerns associated with reimportation of
prescription medications and argue for greater use of domestic generic
medications as opposed to reliance on foreign suppliers (Kesselhelm and
Choudhry, 2008). While the I-Save Rx program relied on pharmacies approved by
Illinois Health inspectors , the Canadian pharmacies began looking to other
countries such as Fiji to supplement their supply when pharmaceutical
manufacturers reduced the Canadian supply (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report,
11/04/2005). Undoubtedly, the issue of Canada serving as a pass through country
for prescription medications significantly raised the safety concerns. Second, the
FDA flexed its administrative muscle by seizing prescription medications ordered
from Canada, thus creating concern in citizens as to whether or not their
prescription medication would actually arrive (Manning, 2004).
The reimportation of prescription medications was particularly pertinent prior
to the passage of Medicare and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). As previously
mentioned, the elderly are the largest consumers of prescription medications.
Prior to MMA, news reports of seniors being bused to Canada were commonplace.
Policy makers were undoubtedly motivated to take legislative action that would
benefit a large voting bloc. As such, states adopted these drug reimporation
programs. However, after the passage of MMA, which provides prescription drug
coverage to seniors, the need to seek lower cost drugs from Canada has
somewhat subsided.
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Taxing Policies
Taxation dates back to Ancient Egypt when the pharaoh would assess the
people and collect revenue in the form of grain, cattle, and labor. Although now
paid monetarily, taxation remains an important government utility; that theoretically
supplies the necessary revenue for services, such as financial assistance for
prescription drugs. However, one should note that the U.S. has a long standing
history with taxpayer revolt spanning more than 200 years beginning with events
surrounding the American Revolution through the 1970s tax revolt to current Tax
Day Protests (Kingdon 2003, 213; Reynolds 2009). Given that politicians are
undoubtedly cognizant of political fallout associated with taxation, it would seem
fitting that states sparingly approve prescription drug policies incorporating taxing
mechanisms (e.g., levying, deductions, or exemptions). While only two states
have adopted a prescription drug taxing policy, Louisiana has adopted two such
policies. One policy applies a sales tax on prescription drugs paid by health
insurance issuers, members, or insureds, while the other policy exempts
prescription drugs purchased through Medicare Part D from local sales and use
tax (Chapter 582; Act 608). In addition, Washington provided tax deductions to
physicians and clinics for cost of drugs that are not typically self-administered
(Washington State Department of Revenue 2007).
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Preferred Drug Lists
Similar to pooled purchasing or drug discount programs, Preferred Drug
Lists (PDLs) are another mechanism used to combat the rising costs of
prescription medications. States negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers to
obtain manufacturer rebates in exchange for a product being placed on the
preferred drug lists. By and large, PDLs operate as a type of drug formulary
identifying the drugs that will be reimbursed by the payer (e.g., employer,
government, or health insurance company). In essence, patients face a lower
copayment or discount by limiting their medications to those on the preferred drug
lists. Patients who require medications not on the list may face higher copayment
or be required to demonstrate clinical necessity in the form of a prior
authorization.9 Research suggests that PDLs are consistent across states with at
least nine states having the same list (Ketchum and Ngai, 2008). The lists are not
strictly created based on financial considerations but must also meet clinical
requirements and be approved by drug utilization review boards. However, health
service providers have expressed concern related to the negative impact on health
status and health outcomes. In particular, physicians have raised concern about
the delay or discontinuation of drug therapy that may result from patients being
required to get prior authorization from drugs not on the PDL (Elam et al, 2005).
Additionally, research suggests that while states may be saving money by limiting
drugs to those with a lower cost, they may be spending more in terms of increased
hospitalizations and office visits (Murawski, 2005).
9

Prior authorization is an administrative tool requiring that a physician obtain approval from a payer prior
to prescribing the medication (MacKinnon and Kumar, 2001). Medications typically listed on PDLs do not
require prior authorization.
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Quantity-Side Approaches
Generic Drug Use
The availability of generics is nothing new. Generic products are available
in everything from peas to pencils and are most often priced at a considerable
discount compared to their branded counterparts. In that way, generic products
offer consumers an opportunity to save money. Generic medications provide a
way to reduce the costs of prescription drugs by providing a safe and lower cost
alternative to branded products. As the dollars spent on pharmaceuticals continue
to rise, payers (e.g., patients, employers, and insurance companies) look for ways
to reduce the costs. One such way is through the use of generic medications.
According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) a generic medication is
“identical, or bioequivalent to a brand name drug in dosage form, safety, strength,
route of administration, quality, performance, characteristics, and intended use.”
(US Food and Drug Administration, 2007). According to the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2007), generic medications cost $32 per prescription compared to
$111 for brand medication. The difference in cost indicates that generic
medication cost a third less than brand medication. The potential savings have
prompted states to capitalize on the savings through legislative means. In general,
states have adopted two policy approaches to encourage the use of generic
medications, one targeting the patient and the other targeting the physician.
Patient related policies have focused on allowing automatic switching from
brand to generic products. Starting in 1989, states began to pass legislation
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allowing pharmacists to automatically dispense generic medications in place of
branded medications. Prior to 1989, most states legally prohibited a pharmacist
from dispensing a drug other than the one expressly written by the physician. The
increase in costs did not go unnoticed by the states. Subsequent to 1989, all
states had a law in place allowing pharmacists to dispense the lower cost (i.e.,
generic) alternative medication. To date most states allow a pharmacist to
automatically substitute a therapeutically equivalent drug for the one written on the
prescription (Hellerstein 1998; Rubenstein 2007). In 2006, an unprecedented
number of brand named drugs had alternative generics come to market. The
brand medications that went generic in 2006 could have resulted in $24.7 billion in
savings to the nation (Cox, Behm, and Mager 2007). Physician related policies
have focused on the approach commonly referred to as counter or academic
detailing. While pharmaceutical representatives visiting physician offices to
educate and advocate for the use of a particular branded medication is a common
phenomenon, what is less known is that states also send out pharmacists to
advocate and educate on the benefits of generic medications. In 2008,
Pennsylvania adopted a counter detailing program to educate physicians within
the state on the advantages of generic medications (Guadagnino, 2005).
Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C. have all followed suit in
hiring academic detailers in an effort to counter the claims of pharmaceutical
representatives and yield savings for taxpayers. As expected, the pharmaceutical
industry rejects the claim that physicians are unable to discern for themselves the
appropriate medication for their patient (Buntin, 2009).
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In addition to encouraging physicians to prescribe generics, states have
also adopted programs to encourage the patient to utilize generic medications.
Vermont’s 2007 drug legislation S.115 created a generic sample voucher program
providing a financial incentive to encourage patients to obtain generic medication.
Although generics have the potential for significant savings, they are not
always the lowest priced option, presenting a quandary for states that mandate the
automatic switching from brand to generic medications. States who only
reimburse for generic medications when a lower cost brand product was available
would not realize the expected savings. Thus, some states have also adopted
legislation to accommodate such situations where brand name drugs are cheaper
than generic medications. In particular, Utah has adopted legislation allowing
Medicaid to reimburse for the lower cost rather than the generic only.
Brand Drug Use
Brand medications contribute a significant amount to prescription drug
costs. As mentioned earlier, brand medications can cost three times as much as
generic medications. For all intent and purposes, the difference in price is
attributed to the initial research and development of new drug entities which is
often quoted as approximately $800 million per new drug innovation (DiMasi,
Hansen, and Grabowski 2003; Congressional Budget Office 2006). While the
actual R&D costs provide fodder for an interesting debate, states have focused on
policies to address the cost issue of brand name prescription drugs.
Even though states have adopted programs to promote the use of generics,
states have also adopted policies aimed at the other half of the equation (i.e.,
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brand name medications). In general, state brand drug policies have coalesced
with the state generic drug policies. For example, if states have adopted policies
to encourage generics, they have also adopted policies to limit the use of brand
name medications to those situations that are clinically and financially prudent.
States such as Rhode Island have used financial incentives, higher copayments
for brand products and lower copayments for generic medications, to encourage
the use of generics while discouraging the use of brand products. Similarly,
Tennessee, legislation Ch. 564 specifies that barring any physician comment of
medical necessity, patients of a state sponsored plan may receive the branded
medication if they are willing to pay the entire cost of the branded product,
whereas the generic products are reimbursed by the state.
Not all state legislation surrounding branded products is designed to
mitigate their use. In fact, some states have adopted policies aimed at providing
access to branded products. States like Vermont, have adopted policies allowing
for the off-label use of prescription drugs for cancer (Act. 139, 2006). While the
FDA approves drugs based on evidence presented for specific clinical situations,
medical experts may find products to be effective for other medical conditions. For
example, the use of aspirin as a prophylaxis against cardiovascular disease is
commonly accepted by physicians as appropriate for diabetes (Stafford, 2008). In
an effort to control costs, certain prescription drug coverage plans do not
reimburse for the off-label usage of medications. A familiar example of off-label
use not reimbursed is that of Wellbutrin, a commonly prescribed antidepressant
medication that is also an effective smoking cessation product. Without special
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provisions, individuals not diagnosed with depression would be faced with paying
more, if not all, of the cost of a Wellbutrin prescription. However, states like
Vermont have acted on behalf of their residents to provide prescription drug
coverage for those products where the empirical evidence is not as strong
(Stafford, 2008).
Acquisition policies and influencing factors
In the face of economic downturn and rising drug costs, states continue to
develop prescription drug policies to alleviate this pressure. As demonstrated in
the preceding pages, states have a variety of tools at their disposal. However, it is
apparent that not all states have reacted uniformly. Table 4 presents the
acquisition policies that have been adopted over the analytical time period. A one
indicates that the state has adopted at least one acquisition policy over the study
period. The sum of acquisition policy types is presented in the last column. In
essence the table indicates there has been a variety in the acquisition policies
employed by states.
Figure 1Error! Reference source not found. illustrates prevalence of
acquisition policies by state. The map presents the total number of acquisition
policies adopted over the study period by state. Not surprisingly, Maine had the
most policies as it was a forerunner in terms of attempting legislation to place price
restrictions on pharmaceuticals sold to Maine. For example, combining the
information from the map with the information from the table indicates that Maine
has the most number of policies adopted but did not adopt the most types of
acquisition policies.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine which factors influence state
prescription drug policy. Each of the aforementioned prescription drug policies
were designed to assist citizens in acquiring prescription medications. The pricesided policies presented indicate that states heavily utilized the financial tools as a
means to increasing access to prescription medications. It is my hypothesis that
acquisition policies were significantly influenced by the demographic indicators
described in Chapter 2. The state demographics serve to communicate a need to
state policy makers. Thus, states with a greater need for access to prescription
medications may be more likely to support the aforementioned acquisition policies.
States facing greater economic challenges may be more likely to adopt the pricesided strategies described in this chapter.
Additionally, a certain degree of clinical and economic knowledge would be
beneficial in the development of the access policies. In the case of PDL, Generic
and brand policies, clinical and economic knowledge is required to compare the
efficacy and cost-effectiveness of competing products. An understanding of public
finance would undoubtedly be of benefit in the construction of the acquisition
policies. My supposition is that states with greater legislative professional
resources would be more likely to adopt these types of access policies. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, the state legislatures may be influenced by what other
states are doing, especially in situations where policies have been successful. In
the case of access policies, states reported significant savings, thus potentially
influencing other states to follow suit. States facing economic pressures may look
to the successful policies of other states for solutions. In addition to the media
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attention given to rising prescription drug costs, individuals reel from the effects of
rising costs when they get a prescription filled. For a majority of Americans
prescription drug costs is a salient issue. Drug costs are perceived to be out of
hand. Under each of the acquisition policies, states are expanding the role of
government. From the 340b to the PDL policies, state legislatures are expanding
the amount of services provided, the amount of money provided, government
relationships, or the amount of taxation. States with a conservative ideology are
generally opposed to the expansion of government. Thus, I would expect that
states with a liberal ideology to be more in favor of such policies. Similarly, states
with Democratic Party control are more often than not in support of redistributive
policies.
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340B
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Total

Bulk
purchasing

Drug
Discount
1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

11

1
1
1
1
1
20

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
27

MMA

Subsidy

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
50

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

Importation

Tax

PDL

Generic
1
1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Brand

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
36

12

5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
30

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

14

18

1
1
1

Total
4
2
2
2
7
6
6
5
4
4
2
6
3
3
5
5
2
2
6
5
6
9
2
5
4
6
4
2
1
3
6
2
4
6
4
3
3
4
2
6
4
3
6
5
7
8
8
6
5
5
3
223

Table 4: States with Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies
This table identifies which state has adopted at least one of the prescription drug
policies between 1999-2008 classified as acquisition.
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Figure 1: Geographic Variation of State Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies
This graph illustrates the variation in the number of acquisition policies adopted
between 1999-2008.
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CHAPTER 4: STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY: SAFETY
The success or failure of any government in the final
analysis must be measured by the well-being of its citizens.
Nothing can be more important to a state than its public health;
the state's paramount concern should be the health of its people.
~ Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Almost everyone in the U.S. has taken prescription medication at one time
or another. On average patients fills 8.2 prescriptions per year in 1999 and 12.4
prescription per year in 2007, indicating an increase in the utilization (Express
Scripts, 1999 & 2008). For the most part, the utilization of prescriptions is safe. In
other words, patients obtain the correct medication without a negative effect on
their health. In fact, medication is designed to improve or maintain health status.
However, there are times when the medication proves harmful. The damage of
prescription medication is often associated with adverse drug events (ADEs) or
medication errors (MEs) (Bates et al. 1995). Adverse drug events are described
as injuries resulting from the drug. ADEs are often a consequence of drug
interactions or dosing issues. In addition, ADEs can be explained by serious side
effects. For example, the heart attacks associated with Vioxx and rhabdomyolysis
associated with Baycol were considered adverse drug events (Jameson, 2002;
Kritz, 2008). The FDA eventually removed the drugs from the market. Medication
errors, on the other hand, are mistakes that occur in the process of ordering or
delivering prescription medication. MEs can occur during the ordering, dispensing,
or administration. The 2006 Institute of Medicine report, contracted by Center for
Medicaid and Medicare Services, cite several studies estimating the cost of ADEs
and MEs range from $8,750 per hospital stay to annual cost of $887 million dollars.

Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 66
States have developed policies to allay the safety concerns associated with
medications since the 19th century when arsenic, cocaine, and opium were
commonly used in medical care. Some of these early proposals, such as those
suggesting manufacturers place drug ingredients on the label, were designed to
increase patient safety (Hilts, 2003, 32). While manufacturers no longer use
arsenic, cocaine, and opium in the medications, states have continued in their
development of prescription drug safety policies.
While policy specifics fluctuate, prescription drug safety concerns in the 21st
century have resulted in state policies targeting generics, labeling, reuse or
recycling, regulation of clinical trials, and transmission of electronic prescriptions
(National Conference of State Legislatures). For the purpose of this analysis,
safety policies were defined as policies designed to mitigate ADEs or MEs and
limited to those policies that were directed at the wellbeing of the individual.
Similar to the analysis of acquisition policies, I believe that the summative
categorization of safety policies allows for a more parsimonious analysis of the
factors influencing prescription drug policies rather than using the four separate
safety policies. Table 5 depicts the legislation categorized as safety policies.
This chapter will discuss the various state prescription drug policies designed to
enhance prescription drug safety for residents.
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Name of Safety Prescription Drug Policy
Generic Drugs
Electronic prescription orders
Reuse or recycling of pharmaceuticals
Disclose or regulate in-state Rx clinical trials
Table 5: Safety Prescription Drug Policies
This table presents that state prescription drug policies included in the Safety
classification.
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Policy Descriptions
Generic Drugs
Few argue that generic medications do not provide a cost effective
alternative to the branded medications; however, criticism has mounted
surrounding their safety, efficacy, and market advantage. Although the federal
government has regulatory authority over food and drugs, state governments have
adopted or attempted to adopt public policy designed to fill in gaps left by the FDA.
In particular, opponents of the use of generic anti-epileptic medications indicate
that these drugs are ineffective and have a lower likelihood of seizure control than
their branded counterparts. In most states, pharmaceuticals may automatically be
switched from a brand product to generic product as long as they are chemically
equivalent as determined by the FDA (Rubenstein, 2007). In 2007, several states
considered policy adoptions limiting the automatic switching from branded antiepileptic medications to generic anti-epileptic medications.
On the issue of efficacy, some states have adopted policies to educate the
public on the differences, advantages, and disadvantages of generic medications.
In 2004, Vermont passed legislation to develop an evidence-based education
program. With contributions from various health care professionals (i.e.,
physicians, pharmacists, private insurers, hospitals, pharmacy benefit managers,
and the drug utilization review boards), the education program provides
information and education on the therapeutic and cost-effective utilization of
generic medications.
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Electronic prescription orders
Undoubtedly the most prevalent method of obtaining a prescription involve
first receiving a written order form from a physician. The patient then takes the
prescription form to a pharmacy where the medications are then dispensed.
Physicians are notorious for their illegible handwriting. As the name implies,
electronic prescribing would replace the traditional pen and paper method with
electronic transmissions of prescriptions. Electronic prescribing entails the use of
technology (e.g., computer, personal digital assistant (PDA) by a physician to
submit prescription orders directly to a pharmacy. Experts argue that the use of
electronic prescribing would significantly reduce the number of medical errors
associated with prescribing (E-health Initiative, 2004).
State policies were assisted at the federal level where policymakers set
standards for the use of electronic prescribing (Leavitt, 2007). State legislative
initiatives piggybacked on the federal legislation by further encouraging the use of
electronic prescribing. In 2008, states like Minnesota required all providers,
prescribers, and dispensers to “establish and maintain an electronic prescription
drug program for transmitting prescriptions and prescription-related information
using electronic media” (Chapter 358, 2008). While Minnesota required the
development and maintenance, it did not require the use of the technology.
Arguably the state, much like the character from the motion picture Field of
Dreams supported the “Build it and they will come” approach. In essence, the
state hope that once the technology was available that health service providers
would begin using the system. California went even further to promote electronic
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prescribing by providing hardware and software to prescribers (Chapter 698,
2006).10 According to the National ePrescribing Patient Safety Initiative 2006
Legislation Fact Sheet, twenty-five states had adopted electronic prescribing
legislation between 2003 and 2006.
Reuse or recycling of pharmaceuticals
As mentioned earlier, prescription medications can be quite expensive,
particularly cancer medications. Initially prompted by the requests of cancer
patient families, who saw expensive drugs being flushed down the toilet, states
adopted policies allowing unused prescription medications to be recycled and
reused. In general, these policies allow entities such as hospitals and nursing care
facilities to donate approved medications to participating pharmacies. The
recycled medications are then distributed to the indigent population. While the
state policies appear consistent on only allowing unused, sealed, tamper-resistant
medications to be donated, state policies vary on issues such as who can donate,
what drugs can be donated, and who will accept the donations. By regulating
which entities can donate and what can be donated, the policy attempts to address
the safety concerns while providing access to much needed expensive
medications. Prior to these state policies, donating entities were adhering to the
federal rules specified in the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1997, whereby the
FDA prohibited the reselling of pharmaceutical products. According to the
American Medical Association, the FDA issued a “non-objection letter” on

10

Although executive orders are outside the purview of this analysis, Illinois state governor Rod
Blagojevich established the Division of Patient Safety to promote the use of electronic prescribing
among all Illinois health care providers by 2011.
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February 25, 2000 which stated that it would not object to the state recycling
programs (Wang, 2000).
Since 1997, 37 states have adopted such recycling policies (National
Conference of State Legislatures). Arkansas, Kentucky, California, Maine,
Michigan, and Minnesota limit donations to health care organizations such as
hospital or nursing care facilities (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2009). In Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Missouri, individuals and
families, in addition to health care organizations, are allowed to donate unused
medications. Oklahoma Representative Darrell Gilbert argued that the reuse and
recycle prescription drug policies also assist in tackling the environmental
concerns of the discarded medications contaminating the water supply
(Thompson, 2005). While Oklahoma and Iowa report policy success, physicians
are cautionary about the effects on medication compliance (Wapner, 2009). Their
concern rests on the fact that a voluntary donation program may result in
medication being available for patients this month but not the next (Wapner, 2009).
In an attempt to address the supply concern of physicians, proponents (e.g.,
pharmacists, health care providers, and volunteers) of the program have explored
options including public education about what should be done with unused
medications.
Disclose or regulate in-state Rx clinical trials
Prior to FDA approval of prescription medications, drug manufacturers
provide empirical evidence of safety and efficacy. The evidence is gathered
through an extensive clinical trial process. Figure 2 illustrates the four phases (i.e.,
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pre-clinical, phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3), which correspond to the degree to
which the drug is tested on humans. The drug is tested on animals in the preclinical phase and by phase 3 trials are tested on approximately 3,000 people
(Food and Drug Administration, 2009). While the FDA goes through great pains to
defend its reputation as safeguarding public health, incidents, such as the removal
of Baycol and Vioxx, have called into question the approval process employed by
the FDA (Carpenter et al. 2003; Carpenter 2004; Olson 2004). Therefore, states
have proposed legislation requiring that clinical trial results be registered with
health care providers. However, to date, no state has passed such legislation.

Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 73

Preclinical
Phase
•Laboratory and
animal studies
•Assess Safety
and biological
activity
•Lasts Year 1-2
•New Drugs
Passed 1--%

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

•20-100
volunteers
•Determine
safety and
dosage
•Lasts Year 3
•70% of
Investigational
new drug (IND)

•Controlled
efficacy trials
•100-300
volunteers
•Evaluate
effectiveness
and side
effects
•Lasts years 4-5
•33% of INDs

•Human
subjects trial
•Production
evaluation
•1000-3000
patient
volunteers
•Verify
effectiveness
and monitor
adverse effects
•27% of INDs

Phase IV
•Long term
effects of the
drug
•Reporting of
adverse drug
effects

Figure 2: Food and Drug Approval Process*11
This graphic presents the activities involved at each phase in the FDA approval
process.

11

Modified from Lipsky and Sharp, 2001. From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval Process.
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Chapter Conclusion
While physicians take the Hippocratic Oath, which espouses the medical
duties to do no harm, others (e.g., pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies)
involved in prescription drug delivery make no such proclamation. To some
extent, state legislators have taken on this responsibility to advocate for policies
related to the safety of prescription medications; however, not each state has done
so nor have states proceeded in a uniform approach. It is the purpose of this
dissertation to examine which factors influence whether a state takes up this
charge or not. This chapter has presented the various approaches employed by
states.
For political, economic, and social reasons, state legislatures have a vested
interest in the well-being of the citizens they represent. As discussed in Chapter 3,
state legislatures have utilized a variety of financial techniques to promote the wellbeing of residents related to prescription drugs. Similarly, state legislatures have
made use of various public policies to address prescription drug safety concerns
(Table 6). Each of the aforementioned prescription drug policies were designed to
tackle prescription safety problems such as those triggered by ADEs or MEs.
In each of the safety policies, states attempted to regulate entities involved
in the delivery of prescription medication with the intent of safeguarding patients.
As mentioned earlier, all state prescription drug policy may at the most basic level
appears as though it is attempting to regulate access in one form or another.
However, the prescription drug policies classified as safety are different from those
listed in acquisition and distribution policy category based on the substantive
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difference in the primary objective. The safety policies as they are defined here
target the well-being of citizens.
Figure 3 illustrates the geographic distribution of prescription drug safety
policies. Unlike acquisition policies, where every state had adopted at least one
policy, not all states have adopted a safety policy. Similar to acquisition policies;
however, Maine had the most policies adopted.
I hypothesize those demographic factors indicating prescription drug need
influence the adoption of safety policies. Similar to the acquisition policies, state
demographics serve to communicate a need to state policy makers. It is my
supposition that safety policies were significantly influenced by the demographic
indicators described in Chapter 2. In the same way that state demographics serve
to communicate need to state policy makers, state demographics serve as
indicators of potential safety risks associated with prescription medications. States
with an older, poorer, less educated and more sickly population may be more likely
to adopt the regulatory policies described in this chapter.
Throughout the history of prescription drug regulation in the United States,
issue saliency has proved a major impetus for government intervention. In the
case of reuse or recycling of prescription medications, the citizen demands to
make sure the reuse of medication was implemented safety prompted response
from legislators. Although the safety issues were different, public concern was the
impetus for public action. Hence, issue salience may be a stronger predictor on
safety policies than that of financial policies. According to one survey of
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Americans, 51% indicated they “closely followed” news reports related to the
Institute of Medicine report on the medical errors in hospitals.
In addition to demographics, the legislative professionalism within a state
may influence adoption of prescription drug safety policies. In the case of generic
drug policies, clinical and regulatory knowledge is required to assess the gaps in
FDA regulation and the safety threats of prescription medications. An
understanding of health information technology would undoubtedly be of benefit in
the construction of the electronic prescription policies. My hypothesis is that states
with greater legislative professional resources would be more likely to adopt these
types of safety policies.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the state legislatures may be influenced by
what other states are doing especially in situations where policies have been
successful. Unlike acquisition policies where the reported significant savings may
influence other states to follow suit in adopting such policies, safety policies may
be influenced by states that have successfully reduced the incidence of ADEs or
MEs.
Under each of the safety policies, state governments are projecting
themselves into the business that is prescription medications. From how
prescriptions are written to the reuse of prescription medications, states’
legislatures are introducing policies to regulate the dispensing of prescription
medications. States with a conservative ideology are generally opposed to the
intrusion of government into the market. Thus, I would expect that states with a
liberal ideology would be more in favor of such policies.
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Table 6: States with Safety Prescription Drug Policies
This table presents the state prescription drug policies adopted by each state
between 1999-2008. One indicates the state adopted at least one prescription
drug policy over the analytical period.
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Figure 3: Geographic Variation of State Prescription Drug Safety Policies
This map illustrates the total number of prescription drug safety policies adopted
between 1999-2008.
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CHAPTER 5: STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY: DISTRIBUTION
“Government is a trust, and the officers of the government are
trustees, and both the trust and trustees are created for the benefit of
the people” – Henry Clay (1829)

While political science scholars explore the concept of public trust and its
impact on society, legislators continue to act as trustees in policymaking for the
interest of citizens (Damico, Conway, and Damico 2000). Public concern over
unfair business practices have prompted states to develop policies related to the
distribution of prescription medications. In particular, public trepidation regarding
the effect of business practices on the use, access, and quality of prescription
medications have prompted state action. It is the state prescription drug policies
designed to regulate distribution organizations that is the focus of this chapter.
In 2005, 3.6 billion prescription medications were purchased in the United
States (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). Patients were able to secure these
medications through a myriad of sources including retail pharmacies, mail-order
pharmacies, internet pharmacies, hospitals, and clinics. Figure 4 illustrates the
various prescription drug distribution channels and the distribution hierarchy. State
lawmakers have adopted a number of prescription drug policies to regulate retail
pharmacies mail-order pharmacies, internet pharmacies, hospitals, and clinics
(Table 7).
Although distribution policies are similar to safety policies in that they are
both regulatory, it is my supposition that safety and distribution policies differ in
their regulatory objectives, thus warranting separate chapters. Specifically, safety
policies attempt to regulate with the objective of citizen wellbeing, whereas
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distribution policies are designed to police those entities responsible for distribution
of prescription medications with the objective of mitigating unfair business
practices. The delineation between safety and distribution policies is based on the
hypothesis that different factors will influence policy with patient safety objectives
compared to those with more policing objectives.
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Figure 4: Prescription Drug Distribution Channel
This graphic presents the relationship between pharmaceutical manufacturer and
pharmaceutical distributors.
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Name of Distribution Prescription Drug Policies
Pharmaceutical marketing and advertising
Regulate retail pharmacies
Regulate mail-order pharmacies
Regulate internet pharmacies
Regulate wholesalers
Regulate of PBM
Table 7: State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies
This table lists the prescription drug policies classified as distribution.
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Pharmaceutical marketing and advertising
There are two diametrically opposed positions when it comes to the
marketing and advertising of pharmaceuticals. On one side is the position that
marketing and advertising provide a public service by informing patients and
physicians about disease and treatment options (Woloshin, et al, 2001). On the
other side is the position that marketing and advertising undermine the patient and
physician relationship, increase costs, and result in unnecessary demand for
pharmaceuticals (Rosenthal et al. 2002; Rosenau, Lal, and Glasser, 2009). IMS,
the leading expert on pharmaceutical related data, estimated that pharmaceutical
manufacturers spent over $27 billion in 2004 on product marketing and advertising
(IMS Health, 2005). While the marketing and advertising activities of prescription
manufacturers may provide a public service, the fact remains that concern over the
effect of the perceived unfair business practices have sparked state legislatures to
address the issue. In particular, states have focused on the physician
communications, leaving regulation of print and television media to the federal
government12.
Historically, pharmaceutical manufacturers would promote their products
through physician detailing which refers to the use of pharmaceutical
representatives to educate the physician on a given pharmaceutical product.
Anyone visiting a doctor’s office has undoubtedly seen the barrage of

12

In 1997, the FDA released guidelines related to pharmaceutical advertising that increased the usage of
direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising. While, prior to 1997, manufacturers were allowed to engage in
direct-to-consumer advertising, the requirement to disclose side-effects, effectiveness, and
contraindications was somewhat ambiguous and difficult to interpret. The 1997 guidelines indicated that
disclosure and adequate provision requirements could be met if the DTC mentioned that additional
information could be obtained from their doctor, a telephone number or website.
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pharmaceutical representatives entering the office with information (e.g.,
pamphlets or study results) and samples. Physicians indicate that they trust the
information provided by pharmaceutical representatives and that the interactions
with pharmaceutical representatives are beneficial to patient care (Fischer, et al.,
2009). However, pharmaceutical representatives might bring gifts in addition to the
educational information and samples. The gifts may range from low value items
such as pens and memo pads to expensive gifts such as travel to conferences in
exotic locations. It is the concern that gift giving will influence physician prescribing
that has triggered public action. However, little evidence exists to substantiate the
claim that gifts are harmful to patient care (Huddle, 2008).
One way states have attempted to address the problem is to reduce the
financial incentives paid to service providers. For example, Arizona proposed
legislation requiring manufacturers to fully disclose prescription marketing costs
and prohibiting gifts of more than $50 made to physicians (Arizona HB2562, 2008).
New York legislators have taken it one step further and attempted to require
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and wholesalers to report annually and
publicly disclose contributions made to health care prescribing practitioners when
they exceed a specific value (New York S2971, A 7468a, 2008).
In addition to financial gifts, pharmaceutical manufacturers also provide
drug related information to those who prescribe prescription medications. States
have attempted to tackle the issue of misleading information. Washington, D.C.
passed the SafeRx Amendment Act in 2008 regulating pharmaceutical
representatives and prohibiting them from engaging in deceptive or misleading
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marketing (Council of the District of Columbia D.C. Official Code § 1-206.02(c)(1),
2008). Maine passed legislation prohibiting the inappropriate use of marketing
messages to prescribers via electronic prescribing software (Maine Public Law
Chapter 362, 2007).
Regulation of Retail Pharmacies
The bulk of prescription medications are dispensed via retail pharmacies.
In fact, close to 3 billion prescriptions were filled in chain and independent retail
pharmacies in 2008 (IMS Health, 2009). The retail pharmacies include companies
most Americans are familiar with such as Walgreens, CVS, and Target, but they
also include independent pharmacies such as Happy Harry’s. For each state in
which the pharmacy operates, the pharmacy must meet the states’ individual rules
and regulations governing pharmacy practice. For example, Walgreens must
adhere to the state licensing and dispensing regulations for the 50 states in which
it operates a pharmacy (Walgreens, 2009). The laws are designed to ensure that
pharmacies are practicing an acceptable standard of care and to avoid
incompetent or dangerous acts by pharmacies or pharmacists.
With so much at stake in terms of potential earnings and health care
delivery, states have adopted policies to address the issue of unfair business
practices. Unfair business practices often include issues of market advantage.
Market advantage can be described as those situations which promote a
competitive advantage of one product over another. States are addressing what
might be construed as unfair business involving the nation’s largest retailer. In
2006, Wal-Mart announced its $4 generic program which charges consumers $4
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for a 30-day supply of selected medication. Several states (i.e., California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming) proposed legislation aimed at “predatory pricing.” The policies prohibit
retailers from selling products below market prices. Unfortunately, the state policy
has had unintended consequences. In particular, consumers now pay more for 14
generic drugs purchased at Target and about 55 generic drugs purchased at WalMart (National Conference of State Legislatures). Additionally, industry experts
argue that the $4 generic effect on patients overall was negligible for most of
patients but has benefited those poor and uninsured patients the most.
Regulate Mail-Order pharmacies
Second only to retail pharmacies, mail-order pharmacies account for 16%
($101 billion) of the prescription drug sales in the U.S. (IMS Health, 2008). Mailorder pharmacies provide both convenience and cost saving opportunities for
patients. For example, individuals who live in remote locations can secure
prescription medications from a mail-order pharmacy. Additionally, their costs are
substantially lower as a result of volume discount on medications from
manufacturers, use of automated prescription filling technology, and filling more
than one month supply of medication to patients (Enright, 1987; Wertheimer,
Andrews, 1995). Patients typically benefit financially from the lower distribution
and dispensing fees by paying for two months supply while receiving a three
month supply of medicine. States have seen the financial benefits offered by mailorder pharmacies and have thus put in place legislation to encourage their use.
For example, states like Maine and Colorado adopted legislation to allow Medicaid
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recipients to use mail-order pharmacy (Chapter 237, 2008). In addition, Maryland
established a $20 maximum copayment amount for those enrolled in the State
Prescription Drug Plan (Chapter 28, 2006).
However, not all states are so receptive to the use of mail-order
pharmacies. Historically, mail-order pharmacies were in competition with retail
pharmacies. Contrary to retail allegations of the dangers associated with mailorder pharmacies, a study authorized under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988, found no evidence suggesting that the quality of medications or care
was inadequate. Additionally, scholars found that mail order customers were more
satisfied with the pharmacy services than those of retail pharmacies (Johnson, et
al. 1997). Nonetheless, retail pharmacies began to lobby states in an effort to
impede the use of mail order pharmacies. As such, states such as Wisconsin
have passed legislation requiring that all mail order pharmacies be licensed by the
State Pharmacy Examining Board (Act 242, 2006). While similar to the
requirement that retail pharmacies be licensed in the state in which they are
operating a pharmacy, this legislation would require mail order pharmacies to be
licensed in states where they will be mailing prescription medications. For
example, if a mail-order pharmacy is physically located in Arizona but mails
prescriptions to Wisconsin, the pharmacy must meet the licensing and regulation
required by Wisconsin. Additionally, states have adopted legislation to protect the
financial interests of state owned and operated pharmacies. For example, Maine
has required that the all MaineCare beneficiaries have a local retail option to the
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out-of-state mail order options. However, in Michigan legislation was adopted to
remove legal barriers to mail-order companies operating in the state.
Regulate Internet Pharmacies
Use of the internet to purchase products has permeated the U.S. Thus, it
should be no surprise that citizens have turned to the internet to purchase
prescription medications. As with other products, the use of the internet has
advantages of savings and convenience and disadvantages surrounding privacy,
safety, and security. However, the fact that prescription medications are digested
into the body, the safety concerns are somewhat different and potentially more
dangerous than other internet purchases. While the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) regulates that a valid prescription must accompany all
pharmacy dispensed medications, there are “rogue sites.” According to the FDA,
these rogue websites engage in illegal business practices such as selling
counterfeit medications or dispensing without a valid prescription (Food and Drug
Administration, 2001). The National Board of Pharmacies working with federal,
state, consumers, and internet pharmacies developed the Verified Internet
Pharmacy Practice Sites (VIPPS). In general, the VIPPS program is similar to a
Good Housekeeping Award. Internet pharmacies who apply for VIPPS
accreditation must meet state licensing requirements and the 18-point criteria
based on quality, patient confidentiality, and pharmacy practice. Those meeting
the requirement will receive VIPPS certification which can be placed on the
website as an indicator to patients of the quality and status of the internet site.
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Since 2003, states have adopted strategies to regulate this industry
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2009). Pharmacies not only serve as
dispensing centers but also provide consultative services to patients. It is due to
the concern for patient safety that states such as New Hampshire, Arkansas,
Idaho, and Louisiana, have adopted legislation requiring that a relationship
between licensed practitioner and patient be established prior to transaction.
Wisconsin requires that the pharmacy be licensed in the state by the State
Pharmacy Examining Board (Act 242, 2006). In addition to regulating the
pharmacies, Texas has created legislation to create a public awareness campaign
to educate the public about the potential dangers of online pharmacies.
Regulate Wholesalers
Closely associated to the regulation of internet pharmacies is the states’
desire to regulate pharmaceutical wholesalers. In the case of prescription drugs,
the term wholesaler is not limited to manufacturer. Wholesalers are those entities
that purchase directly from the manufacturer for resale to pharmacies and may
include warehouses, manufacturers or repackagers (Frank, 2001). Prompted by
both safety and unfair business practice concerns over prescription drug
authentication, states are adopting legislation requiring wholesalers to ascertain
the pedigree of prescription medications (Laven, 2006). In addition to the pedigree
requirement, states like Colorado require wholesalers to complete a criminal
history background check.
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Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers
In addition to pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers,
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) play a role in the delivery of prescription
drugs. In general, PBMs act in a fashion similar to managed care organizations,
only without assuming the financial risk. While initially PBMs served primarily as
claims processing services, PBMs expanded beyond claims processing to include
formulary management, manufacturer rebate contracting, mail-order pharmacy,
drug utilization review, medication compliance, and disease management
programs. Employers would hire PBMs, as claims processors, to aggregate
prescription drug claims from pharmacies, collect payment from the employer, and
pay the pharmacy for those prescription drugs dispensed. In exchange for
providing this administrative function, PBMs would receive an administrative fee or
the difference between the two (i.e., spread). Figure 5 depicts the financial
relationships between PBM, pharmacy and employers associated with claims
processing. Beyond their claims processing role, PBMs serve as consultants in
drug utilization review, medication compliance, and disease management
programs. In their consultant role, PBMs take into account the clinical and
economic considerations to achieve the employers’ goal of effective and efficient
use of financial resources allocated for prescription drugs.
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Figure 5: Illustration of PBM financial relationships between employer and
pharmacy.
This graphic not only presents the roles of a PBM but also the relationship to those
entities being paid by PBMs and those entities paying PBMs. The components
included in the price billed by the PBM and the price paid by the PBM is identified
in the bottom two boxes.
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Undoubtedly PBMs provide a benefit in terms of cost savings; however,
their financial arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers have come under
scrutiny (Rentmeester and Garis, 2008). Through legislation, state legislatures
have attempted to increase transparency into the financial arrangements of PBMs.
Maryland increased the financial disclosure requirement of PBMs. Similarly,
Louisiana’s Pharmacy Patient Protection Act sought to increase disclosure by
requiring PBMs to be licensed with the Department of Health and Hospitals and
disclose financial affiliation with related pharmacy business. As expected, retail
pharmacies were opposed to PBMs since most PBMs operate mail-order
pharmacies. States such as Connecticut required PBMs to annually register with
the state and obtain surety bond insurance.
Chapter Conclusion
As discussed in Chapter 3, state legislatures have utilized a variety of
financial techniques to promote the well-being of residents related to prescription
drugs. Similarly, state legislatures have made use of various public policies to
address prescription drug unfair business practices concerns. Table 6. indicates
that only two states have adopted all four types of distribution policies, whereas,
sixteen (30%) of states have adopted only one type of distribution policy. Figure 6
illustrates that once again, Maine has the most policies adopted. Additionally,
there are many states who have failed to adopt any prescription drug policies to
regulate those entities that distribute prescription medications.
For more than 200 years, the U.S. has embraced classical economics.
During that time, the U.S. has largely applied the market self-regulation approach.
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In essence, there is great faith in the market to correct itself when needed. In the
case of prescription drugs, government has played a narrow role. Unlike the
United Kingdom or Canada, there are no price controls, no national drug formulary
and no universsal coverage of prescription drugs. It is the historic void of
governmental involvement that heightens the intrigue over state actions. Why
would states adopt policies seemingly counter to the underlying economic
principles so prevalent in the U.S. DNA? What are the factors that would influence
state policy adoption regulating prescription drug entities? It is the focus of this
dissertation to explore such factors and their influence on prescription drug policy
adoption.
John Kingdon suggests that problems that violate our societal values are
likely to be construed as a problem needing attention (2003, 198). The strongest
of those values include equity, individual responsibility, and faith in market
solutions. In essence, those situations that are counter to the belief of fairness and
equity might result in increased public concern to the level of government action.
In the case of distribution policies, business actions perceived as unjust or
providing unfair advantages to one group over another might result in adoption of
public policy. However, undoubtedly there are situations when unfair business
practices are at play yet no adoption of public policy adoption transpires. Thus, I
hypothesize that the greater the issue salience, the greater the number of states
adopting policies to address the issue of distribution.
Additionally, the state policies described in this chapter attempt to regulate
entities within a powerful industry. The entities within this industry are represented
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by one of the most influential interest groups in the nation. Thus, one would
expect reasonable resistance to government regulation within this industry. Given
the strength and influence of the pharmaceutical industry, it is a wonder any state
policies attempting to regulate distribution would get adopted. While theory
suggests that public concern and interest groups may influence the adoption of
distributive policies, state legislators also answer to themselves and their political
party. Thus to the extent that the policy proposals are consistent with the political
ideology and the platform of the political party in control, one would expect
government adoption of distribution policies. From how pharmaceutical
representatives interact with physicians to the financial disclosure of PBMs, states’
legislatures are introducing policies to regulate the dispensing of prescription
medications. States with a conservative ideology are generally opposed to the
intrusion of government into the market. Thus, I would expect that states with a
liberal ideology to be more in favor of such policies.
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Pharmaceutical
marketing and
advertising
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Total

Retail

Mail-order

Internet

1
1

Wholesalers

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

PBM

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1

1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1
1

3

1

1

1

1

7

1
29

1
19

20

Total by State

0
0
2
3
4
2
1
1
0
3
2
2
3
1
0
2
2
2
3
1
4
3
1
1
1
1
2
0
3
2
1
1
1
2
0
0
2
1
1
1
0
3
3
2
0
2
1
1
3
0
2
79

Table 8: States with Distribution Prescription Drug Policies
This table presents the state prescription drug policies adopted by each state
between 1999-2008. One indicates the state adopted at least one prescription
drug policy over the analytical period
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Figure 6: Geographic Variation of State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies
This map illustrates the total number of prescription drug distribution policies
adopted between 1999-2008.
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY DATA AND METHODS
“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called
research, would it?” -Albert Einstein
While prescription medications have become an integral part of health care
services, acquisition, safety, and distribution surrounding these products have
given rise to public concern. As discussed in the previous chapters, states have
been innovative in adopting a myriad of public policies increasing access, ensuring
safety, and safeguarding against unfair business practices. However, not all states
have adopted prescription drug policies. Thus, the question still remains as to
which factors affect whether or not a state adopts prescription drug policy.
The focus of this chapter is to present the methodological approach used to
tackle the research question (i.e., what factors influence prescription drug policy?).
First, a brief description of the data sources is presented. Second, covariate
selection with specific research questions in terms of hypotheses is presented.
Included in the third section is a discussion on the methodological approach to
categorization of the prescription drug policies. Lastly, I illustrate the analytical
models.
Data Source
This is a retrospective study comprised of a pooled cross-sectional time
series using data from 1999 through 2008 where each case represents a stateyear. Both practical and theoretical reasons guided the selection of this time
period. From a theoretical standpoint the last ten years has been the most active
in terms of prescription drug policy. The increased use, changes in approval
process, and rising drug costs have put prescription medications on the public
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agenda. From a practical standpoint, the National Conference for State
Legislatures (NCSL) compiled data on prescription drug policy over the last ten
years. According to their website, NCSL obtains information through 50 state
website searches and through services provided via StateNet.13 The data
contained one observation for each state year, resulting in 500 observations over
the ten year time period. In addition to the NCSL data, state legislative websites
were reviewed to obtain legislative details (e.g., wording, date of approval, and
sponsor).
Data from a variety of secondary data sources were used to obtain predictor
variables. Appendix 1 is the full list of the data sources used in the analysis. The
following sections provide detailed descriptions of the predictor and dependent
variables used in the analysis. Data collection, time periods, and any data
limitations data are also discussed.
Prescription Drug Policy Predictor Variables
Predictor variable identification and selection was based on research
discussed in Chapter 2 (Walker, 1969; Mohr, 1969; Gray, 1973; Berry and Berry,
1990; Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993; Mintrom, 1997; Berry and Baybeck, 2005;
Gray, Lowery, and Godwin, 2007; Miller, 2005). The research suggests that state
policy adoption is affected by the population composition, resource capacity,
extraneous factors, and political and ideological influences. The twelve predictor
variables selected for analysis include elderly, poverty, health status, urbanization,
education, state wealth, and interest group activity, legislative professionalism,

13

StateNet is a legislative and regulatory service provider. Information concerning StateNet can be found
at www.statenet.com.
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neighboring state policies, state ideology, political party control, and issue saliency.
Table 2 depicts the covariates and the hypothesized effect on state prescription
drug policy.
Population Composition – In theory, legislators are elected to represent the will
of the people. Thus, one would expect demographics to matter. Specifically
related to prescription drug policy, one would expect states with a disproportionate
share of elderly, poor, sick, lesser educated, or those living in rural areas to
influence policy adoption. The following section briefly presents the rationale for
factor selection and the method of operationalization for variables related to the
states’ population:
State population over the age of 65: As discussed in Chapter 2, states with
a disproportionate share of citizens over the age of 65 may have a greater need for
pharmaceuticals. Research suggests a positive relationship between age and the
use of prescription medications suggesting the greater the proportion of elderly
individuals the greater the need for and utilization of prescription medications.
Thus, lawmakers representing states with a greater percentage of elderly may be
particularly concerned with the issues of pharmaceutical access and safety.
However, the linkage between the percentages of those citizens over 65 and
distribution policy becomes more difficult to establish. As discussed in Chapter 5,
distribution policies are regulatory in nature and are aimed at the entities involved
in distribution of prescription medications. One would not expect the adoption of
distribution policies to be influenced by the percentage of elderly within a state.
Rather for distribution policies, age may be proxy for public opinion.
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Using U.S. Bureau of Census data from 1999 to 2008, age is
operationalized as the percent of population age 65 and older. Figure 7 is a
graphical presentation of the percentage of a state’s population that is 65 years of
age or older. All but three states had more than 10% of their population over the
age of 65.
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Figure 7: Histogram of State Population - Over 65
This graph presents the percentage of a state’s population that is over the age of
65 in 2008.
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State population in poverty: In general, the ability to pay for prescription
medications has become more difficult as the price of prescription medications has
continued to increase faster than the rate of inflation. Undoubtedly, those
individuals with lower income will face more difficulty in paying for needed
medications. As discussed in Chapter 2, legislators rely on indicators to ascertain
which policies to address. Thus, a disproportionate share of the population in
poverty may serve as an indicator to legislators of need for prescription
medications. Lawmakers representing states with a greater proportion of citizens
in poverty may be particularly concerned with the issues of pharmaceutical access
and safety. However, one would not expect adoption of pharmaceutical
distribution policies, discussed in Chapter 5, to be affected by an unequal
representation of poverty. The distribution policies are aimed at regulating the
distribution of prescriptions, regardless of economic status. Thus, I hypothesize
that the greater the percentage of residents below the poverty level the greater the
likelihood of prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition and safety but not those
policies aimed at distribution. Poverty was operationalized as the percentage of
individuals at the 100% Federal Poverty Level according to the U.S. Bureau of
Census. Census data from 1999 to 2008 was downloaded from the U.S. Bureau
of the Census website. Undoubtedly, the poverty rates have changed over the
study period. Figure 8 is a histogram illustrating the number of state and their
percentage of a state’s population considered to be in poverty in 2008.
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Figure 8: Percent of State Population below FPL
This graph illustrates the distribution of proportion of a state’s population that are
below the federal poverty level in 2008.
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Lesser educated population: Similar to previously mentioned factors, the
educational attainment of the population may serve as an indicator to legislator. In
essence, states with a greater proportion of lesser educated citizens may signal a
need for greater need for pharmaceuticals. As mentioned in Chapter 2, education
is positively associated with good health. Thus, the supposition remains that
states with a less educated population may have worse health and thus have
greater need for pharmaceuticals and a greater need of protection against any
dangers and injustice associated with prescription medications. Thus, I
hypothesize that states with a greater proportion of citizens with at least a
bachelor’s degree the fewer prescription drug policies.
Educational attainment of the states’ population was operationalized as the
percent of the population over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree (Wright,
Erikson, and McIver, 1987). Educational attainment data was obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau website. Figure 9 presents the distribution of states and their
proportion of population that have a bachelor’s degree. In 2008, only Colorado,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland have greater than 35% of the
population with a bachelor’s degree.
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Figure 9: Histogram of State Proportion with Bachelor's Degree
This histogram indicates proportion of a state’s population in 2008 with a bachelors
degree ranges from the mid-teens to more than thirty percent.
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Urban population: Similar to the effect that a state with a disproportionate
share of elderly, poor, and less educated population may have on the need of
pharmaceuticals, states with greater portion of citizens residing in rural areas may
serve as an indicator of need. As discussed in Chapter 2, rural areas are
characteristically older, sicker, and poorer and perhaps have a greater need of
access to prescription medications. The distribution policies discussed in Chapter
5 may be of greater concern for rural states than for those with greater
urbanization. For individuals in rural areas, the internet and mail-order pharmacies
may serve as a cost-effective and convenient means to needed medications.
Additionally, more retail pharmacies are located within urban areas than rural
areas. Undoubtedly, the retail pharmacies do not embrace regulatory policies;
consequently, states with larger urban areas may face greater resistance to
distribution policies. Thus, state legislatures of a more rural state may have a
greater number of acquisition, safety, and distribution prescription drug policies.
Consistent with the research of Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987),
urbanization was operationalized as the percent of the population residing in the
State Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). Data on percent of state population
living in urban areas was downloaded from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 2009
Statistical Abstracts website.
Health Status: As mentioned in Chapter 2, health status serves as an
indicator of citizen need for prescription medications. Consistent with other
factors selected for this analysis, states with a disproportionate population in poor
health may have a greater need for pharmaceuticals. The essence of the
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argument is based on the supposition that a healthier population would have less
need for prescription medications. The diminished need may manifest itself into
fewer prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition, safety, or distribution.
While individual health has been measured by the self-reported health status
or the physician-reported number of chronic conditions, both focus on quantifying
the health of the individual and are often used as a proxy for demand of services.
In this analysis, health status is based on the National Center for Chronic
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS).14 The BRFSS data allows for the examination of self-reported
health status representing the state’s population across the study time period.
States with a lower percentage of respondents within a state who responded that
they are in “Good or Better” health may serve to indicate need of health services
such as prescription medication.
Resource Capacity – In theory, state legislators are responsible for carrying out
the will of the people; however, they must act within the confines of their state. In
particular, state legislators are limited by financial resources and staffing with
regard to what they can get done. Limited financial resources may restrict policy
options and limited staffing available may reduce the amount of time spent on
policy options. Thus, the supposition remains that the more resources available,
both in terms of money and staff, the more likely legislators to adopt public policy.

14

According to the CDC website the BRFSS is “The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
is the world’s largest, on-going telephone health survey system, tracking health conditions and risk
behaviors in the United States yearly since 1984.” Telephone survey respondents are asked “Would you
say that, in general, your health is Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair or Poor.”
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The following section briefly presents the rationale for factor selection and the
method of operationalization for variables related to the states’ resource capacity.
Financial Capacity: A state’s financial capacity may influence its willingness
to adopt prescription drug policies. States with fewer dollars available may be
more inclined to utilize the financial based policies discussed in Chapter 3 to
address the access issue than states with greater resources. Safety and
distribution policies which attempt to regulate the actions do not lend to the
supposition that the wealth of a state would be a factor. In other words, one would
not necessarily expect that a wealthy state is more likely to regulate the distribution
of prescription medications, whereas the supposition remains that states with more
money available may be more likely to adopt prescription drug policies to assist
their population.
In this analysis, state financial capacity will be calculated as a ratio by taking
the total state revenue minus the total state spending divided by total spending
(Berry and Berry, 1990, 401). Thus for states where the total expenditure is less
than total revenue, one would see a positive number. However, in cases where
the state has spent more than was collected, one would see a negative number.
The larger the gap between what was spent and what was collected the larger the
ratio. As expected states differ not only in size but in budget, thus calculating
financial capacity in such a manner allows for a comparable measure across
states. The expenditure and revenue data was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. The application of the formula
below to calculate financial capacity will allow for the analysis of slack resources
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on the adoption of state prescription drug policy. Below is the formula used to
calculate the financial capacity of a state.

Financial capacity = total state revenue – total state spending
total state spending

Legislative Professionalism: According to Christopher Mooney (1985, 48)
legislative professionalism “generally refers to the enhancement of the
legislature's capacity to perform its role in the policy-making process with an
expertise, seriousness, and effort comparable to other actors in that process.”
Prescription drug policy can be quite complicated, thus states with greater capacity
in terms of expertise or staffing may be better suited to develop prescription drug
policy, particularly those aimed at safety or distribution.
Research suggests a number of ways in which to operationalize legislative
professionalism including state legislative compensation, days in session,
operating budget per legislator, and the number of staff members per legislator
(King, 2000; Grossback and Peterson, 2004; Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman,
2000, Owings and Borck 2000). Consistent with King (2000) and Owings and
Borck (2000) legislative professionalism is designed to measure the capacity of
state legislators and one such way is by calculation of ratio of staff to legislator. As
previously mentioned states differ not only in physical size but in representation,
thus calculating legislative professionalism in terms of staffing per legislator
allows for a comparable measure across states. Below is the formula used to
calculate legislative professionalism.
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Legislative Professionalism =
# of staff
# of state legislators
Extraneous Influence – In addition to considering who lives in the state and the
resources available, state legislators may also be influenced by the actions or
activities that occur outside of their state. With regard to prescription drug policy,
which can be complex and time consuming, state legislators may look to
neighboring states for ideas on successful policies. The following section briefly
presents the rationale for including neighboring states as a factor and the method
of operationalizing the influence of neighboring states’.
Neighboring State Policy Adoption: In the case of neighboring state
influence, the adage “No man is an island” seems to apply. Whether motivated
by constraints or competitive federalism, as discussed in Chapter 2, state
legislators may look to neighboring states for public policy ideas (Berry and
Berry, 1990; Canon and Baum, 1981). While in the case of prescription drug
policy, Gray, Lowery, and Godwin’s 2007 analysis did not find neighboring state
adoption to explain state policy adoption, their analysis was limited to access
prescription drug policies (i.e., Pharmacy Assistance Programs). Thus, this
analysis examines the influence of neighboring states on state pharmaceutical
policy adoption beyond access to include safety and distribution. A separate
neighboring variable for each of the policy types (i.e., acquisition, cost, and
safety) was created for each year in the analytic time period. For the purpose of
this analysis, the neighboring states variable was calculated as the percentage of
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neighboring states that had adopted the policy the year before (Berry and Berry,
1990). States differ not only in population size but also in the number of
neighboring states, thus calculating neighboring state influence in terms of a
percentage allows for a comparable measure across states. The variable can be
interpreted as the greater the percentage the more neighboring states that have
adopted the policy. The supposition being that a state with more neighbors who
have adopted a policy may see the policy has having less risk or may face
competition to enact a similar policy. Below is the formula used to calculate
neighboring states.

Neighboring state = # of neighboring states with policy in preceding year
# of neighboring states

Issues, Politics, and Ideology – Beyond the already mentioned influences of
state population characteristics, financial and staffing resources, and neighbor
influence, state legislators may also consider those factors related to the values,
beliefs, and preferences of groups within the state. In particular, political parties,
interest groups, and salient issues serve as indicators to state legislators of
important issues. With regard to prescription drug policy, which can be complex
and time consuming, state legislators may look to interest groups for policy
information. Additionally, states legislators may rely on polls, surveys, or news
media to ascertain the important public issues. The following section briefly
presents the rationale and operationalization of interest group influence, political
party control, and issue saliency.
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Interest Group Influence: Historically, pharmaceutical manufacturers and
physician groups have been among the most influential party on health care
issues. Both have used their political influence to pressure elected officials.
However, scholars indicate that even the most powerful interest groups (e.g.,
banking) do not always win when it comes to public policy adoption (Leech, et al,
2007). Thus, the question still remains whether interest groups affect adoption of
prescription drug policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, interest groups may
influence legislators through legislative testimonies, information gathering, and
the most commonly associated activity of political contribution. The theory that
interest groups influence state policy adoption hinges on the supposition that
legislators will be positively influenced by either the information, testimony, or
monetary support provided by the interest group.
As such scholars have utilized lobby registration data to identify which
interest groups would be particularly interested in prescription drug policy (Gray,
Lowery, and Godwin, 2007). In an effort to examine whether interest group
influence affects state adoption of prescription drug policy, this dissertation will
explore the impact by utilizing the amount contributed per legislator. While the
amount spent does not assist in understanding the multiplicity of concerns, it
does serve as a proxy for level of concern. The supposition is that the greater
the amount spent on lobbying efforts the greater the area of concern. Amount
spent between 1999 and 2008 was acquired from the National Institute on Money
in State Politics, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization who gather data on
campaign contributions for all 50 states. The amount spent only included monies
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associated with health care. While the National Institute on Money in State
Politics provides useful information on the amount contributed by lobbying
groups, it does not account for the non-financial contributions made by interest
groups such as emailing, testifying at hearings, and media campaigns. The
breadth and depth of interest group effect is an interesting topic for future
analysis. The lobbying financial data adequately serves to measure interest
group effect. Below is the formula used to calculate interest group influence.

Interest Group Influence = total amount spent per year
# of legislators

Issue Salience: One of the most thought provoking questions for a country
often considered the beacon of democracy is whether or not citizen preference
matters in terms of public policy. Scholars have long since indicated that issues
matter, particularly in terms of agenda setting, policy options, and timeliness
(Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Dahl, 1969, Key, 1961). As discussed in Chapter
2, issues that are of concern to constituents are more likely to get on the public
agenda. Additionally, salient issues may also influence policy solutions and the
expediency with which the policy is addressed. The theoretical supposition rests
on the assumption that public opinion serves as an indicator of issue preference.
Thus, one may expect the issues important to citizens to be first and foremost in
public policy adoption. At the state level, does public opinion make a difference
in the actions of legislators with regard to policy adoption? In asking this
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question, one must first consider how legislators would be made aware of citizen
preferences.
On a national level public opinion polls are readily available to
policymakers; albeit, a state level, public opinion polls are not quite as abundant
(Turner et al, 2009; Rose, 2007). Thus, state lawmakers must undoubtedly rely
on a variety of sources (e.g., press coverage, health assessment surveys, and
national public opinion) to ascertain citizen policy preference (Weissert, 1991;
Epstein and Segal, 2000; Turner et al, 2009). Upon closer investigation one
quickly finds that, with the exception of the debate over the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003 (which grabbed national attention), prescription drug
policy is not a typical subject matter for state public opinion polls nor is it a
subject matter typically discussed in local news media outlets. With the
exception of few states (e.g., Ohio, New Jersey, and New York) that in
conjunction with universities have developed state level polling data repositories,
health assessment surveys may be one of the few data options available to state
lawmakers in their quest to discover the will of the people. According to the
Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) website, the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) has been utilized by states to “identify health
issues at the local level.” Additionally, Turner et al 2009 indicate the health
assessment questionnaires are a viable option for operationalizing issue
saliency. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis issue salience is based on the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Health Assessment Questionnaire.
The BRFSS contains questions related to health status and the importance of
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health insurance. In particular, the BRFSS survey reports the state percentage
of respondents who indicate that securing health services was a concern for
them during the past 12 months. While the BRFSS does not specifically ask the
respondent what the most important issue facing their state is, the survey does
provide legislators with insight into whether or not health services is an important
issue. Legislators could easily interpret the response as an indicator that citizens
view prescription drug policy as an important issue.
Ideology: As indicated in the discussion of issue salience, state legislators
may not always have access to information indicating the public preference on a
particular issue such as prescription drug policy. Absent citizen policy
preference, state legislators may rely on the general political beliefs of the state
citizenry when considering policy adoption. In general, conservatives are more
likely to believe in individual responsibility with limited government involvement,
whereas liberals are more likely to see individuals as constrained by their
situation needing more government assistance. Thus, state legislators
representing states with a greater proportion of citizens with liberal ideology will
be more likely to adopt state prescription drug policies. Thus it is my hypothesis
that liberal states are more likely to adopt the prescription drug acquisition,
safety, and distribution policies described in Chapters, 3, 4, and 5.
Research indicates two primary approaches to measuring ideology. The
first method comes from Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s state citizen ideology
measure. It was constructed from the CBS/NYT survey results from 1976
through 2006. The measure represents the average of the self-reported
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ideological identification by state. The second method computes citizen ideology
as a function of electorate support for the incumbent, electorate support for the
challenger and the ideology of the incumbent and challenger (Berry, Ringquist,
Fording, 1998). The state ideology is computed as an average across all
districts. In essence, the two methods attempt to capture the conservative or
liberalism ideology of a state, ranging from zero to one with one representing
liberal. According to Berry, Ringquist, and Fording (1998) and Meinke, Staton,
and Wuhs (2005) the use of Erikson, Wright, and McIver may not be the most
appropriate for longitudinal data. Research indicates that ideology does vary
over time. Thus, this analysis will utilize the updated Berry, Ringquist, Fording
(1998) data to operationalize ideology (Brace et al., 2004). The selected data will
allow for the evaluation of effect of ideology on prescription drug policy adoption.
In essence, comparing the effect of states with a greater score (i.e., more liberal)
on the adoption of prescription drug policy.
Political Party Control: Whether it is the statehouse or the White House,
political parties undoubtedly seek to gain control. For it is believed that through
the control of government, political parties have access to the distribution of
public funding and input on key policy decisions (Ansolabehere and Snyder,
2003). Additionally, when a single party is in control of state government (i.e.,
legislature and governorship) scholars suggest that such a situation allows for a
greater ability to handle political issues (Berry and Berry, 1990). In essence, to
the extent that a unified controlled state government would be better able to
handle obstacles, one would expect more policy adoption. Beyond the basic
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supposition of one party in control, research suggests it matters which party is in
control. In general, Democratic controlled states legislatures have been more
supportive in terms of redistributive policies and regulatory policies than when
their Republican counterparts are in control. Thus, in the case of prescription
drug policy, one would expect more policy adoption in states with Democratic
control as opposed to states with Republican or split control
In an attempt to capture the political party control of state government,
political party control, in this analysis, has been measured as three separate
dichotomous variables (i.e., Democratic, Republican, or Split). Specifically, if the
Democratic Party had control of both the legislature and governorship a number
1 was assigned to the Democratic variable for that state-year. Subsequently, if
the Republican Party had control of both the legislature and governorship a
number 1 was assigned to the Republican variable for that state-year. In cases
where there no political party controlled the legislature and governorship a
number 1 was assigned to the Split, indicating a Split Party Control.
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Classification and Creation of Dependent Variables
The objective of this analysis was to examine the factors that affect the
adoption of state prescription drug policies. While the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL) provided the foundation of state prescription drug
policies, further manipulation was required to create the dependent variable. First,
the prescription drug policies from 1999 through 2008 were extracted from the
NCSL website. A policy topic code was assigned to each policy by the NCSL. For
example, state legislation where the text centered on drug discount programs was
designated with a policy topic code of D. While the policy topic codes were useful
in providing a guide to policy categorization, the policy description in conjunction
with policy text was used to assign policies to a particular category (i.e.,
acquisition, safety, or distribution). Acquisition policies were those that mentioned
an economic principle, Medicaid, or Medicare in an effort to increase access to
prescription medications. Safety policies were those that mentioned the use of
education, electronic prescribing, and databases to mitigate the possibility of
misuse, abuse, adverse drug events, or medication errors. Distribution policies
were defined as those policies that prohibited or restricted the marketing and
advertising of prescription medications or in some other way regulated the
prescription drug distribution entities. A policy that fit into multiple categories was
assigned to both. For example, a law that contained text on the Preferred Drug list
(i.e., Access) and text on PBM regulation (i.e., Distribution) were associated with
both categories. As expected, there were state policies that did not fit into the
classification schema and were categorized as Other.
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Second, three dummy variables were created; (1) acquisition, (2) safety,
and (3) distribution. For each state-year’s dummy variable, a one was assigned if
the policy passed by the legislature and was signed into law by the Governor.
Third, the three dependent variables, one for each of the categories (i.e.,
acquisition, safety, and distribution), were calculated as a sum of the dummy
variables for each state-year. For each of the three policies for example, states
with no policy will be assigned a zero; states with one policy related to financial of
prescription drugs will be assigned a one; and states with two policies related to
financial of prescription drugs will be assigned a 2; and so on.
Given the breadth and depth of prescription medication use, it is
conceivable that states adopt policy changes beyond initial adoption. For
example, states may periodically propose legislative modification related to the
340B Drug Pricing Program in an effort to expand the savings by adding state
organization to the federally approved list. Doing so would not necessarily be
considered a new policy adoption but rather a change to the original policy. For
this reason, the three dependent variables include legislative adoptions regardless
of whether they are merely a change or are newly created legislation.
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Statistical Analysis
For the purposes of this analysis, the dependent variable, computed as the
count of policy adoptions for a given type of prescription policy, lends itself to the
specific event count regression approach negative binomial regression (King,
1988, 1989). The event count model allows for the examination of phenomenon
where events occur over a period of time and are considered rare (Hamilton, 2003,
Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1987). The number of
policy adoptions between 1999 and 2008 is a nonnegative integer, bounded at
zero on the low end and unbounded high end. An event count model such as
Poisson and negative binomial regression are the most appropriate for this type of
data. However, the key assumption of a Poisson regression is that the variance is
equal to the mean. Scholars suggest that using a Poisson regression model on
over-dispersed data can result in inappropriately small standard errors and larger
Z-values (King 1989; Long 1997). According to Boehmke (2005), heterogeneity
and contagion are two motivations for overdispersion. Heterogeneity which can
result from an “unobserved phenomena within a state influence the number of
proposals reach the ballot” (Boehmke, 2005, 569). In the case of state prescription
drug policy, legislator sponsorship may differ across each of the prescription drug
policy types. Contagion refers to the situation where “the occurrence of an event
in one time period increases the chance of additional events in the same time
period.” In prescription drug policy, contagion effect might occur where proponents
of particular policy are particularly active in one year. Thus in the case where the
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data is over-dispersed, a negative binomial regression is more appropriate (Long,
1997; Boehmke, 2005).
The independent variables included in the model were demographic factors
(i.e., age, poverty, education, urbanization, and health status), external (i.e.,
neighboring policies) and political factors (i.e., ideology, political control and issue
salience). SPSS version 17.0 in conjunction with Stata v8.2 was used for data and
statistical analysis.
In this chapter, the methodological and analytical roadmap was presented
with a brief summary of the hypothesized factors, their rationale for inclusion and
how the factor was operationalized. Although linear regression and logit models
are quite popular in the analysis of public policy, these models were not be the
most appropriate. A negative binomial regression analysis was identified as the
most appropriate method of analysis.
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

While Mark Twain conveys the opinion of many when it comes to
quantitative analysis, and particularly statistics, it nonetheless remains a method
often used in examining state public policy adoption. The previous chapters
introduced the theoretical and methodological foundation for the analysis of state
prescription drug policy adoption. The following chapter presents the results,
starting first with descriptive statistics followed by the model results.
Descriptive Results
Over the ten year period, all 50 states adopted at least one of the
prescription drug policies whether for acquisition, safety, or distribution. There
were 500 observations in the analysis, one record for each year-state over the ten
year analytical period. More states adopted acquisition policies than those aimed
at safety or distribution. Coincidentally, there were twelve different states that did
not adopt safety and twelve states that did not adopt a distribution policy. It is
important to note that early in the study (i.e., 1999, 2000, and 2001), fewer states
had adopted prescription drug policies; however, later in the study, not only were
more states adopting policies but more policies were being adopted. Figures 10,
11, and 12 illustrate the geographic distribution in the year states first adopted
prescription drug policies. In the case of acquisition policy, it is interesting to note
that only Nebraska and Florida adopted their first prescription drug acquisition
policy after the passage of MMA. Figure 11 reveals the fact that 12 states have
not adopted prescription drug policy aimed at safety. Similarly, more than 10
states have failed to adopt prescription drug policy aimed at distribution. In
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general, the maps illustrate there is not a geographic trend related to the policy
adoption. There appears to be quite a bit of geographic variation with no specific
pattern of policy adoption. The 2005 spike in the number of acquisition policies
illustrated in Figure 13 would coincide with legislative activities related to the
passage of Medicare and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). Under the MMA,
those eligible for Medicare could enroll in Medicare Part D, which was designed to
provide access to prescription medications for seniors. However, states had to
adopt legislation to address the dual-eligibles as discussed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 10: Year State First Adopted Acquisition Policy
This map illustrates that states were more active in policy adoption of acquisition
policies earlier rather than in later years.
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Figure 11: Year State First Adopted Safety Policy
This map illustrates that many states have not adopted prescription drug policy
aimed at safety.
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Figure 12: Year State First Adopted Distribution Policy
This map illustrate that a few early adopter of distribution policies and many states
have yet to adopt a distribution targeted policy.
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Figure 13: Policy Count by Year and Type
This chart illustrates that states have been more active on acquisition policies and
were especially active during the period just before MMA went into effect.
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Table 9 displays the descriptive results for the predictor variables. On
average, 12% of the states’ population was over the age of 65 and coincidentally
12% of the states’ population was below the federal poverty level. The average
percent of a state’s population over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree was
26%. According to the analytical description, more of a states’ population live in
urban areas than in rural areas. In fact, the results indicate that on average over
two-thirds of a states’ population live in urban areas. The BRFSS survey results
indicate that on average the states’ population report being healthy. The results
indicate a wide variation in the number of staff per legislator, ranging from less
than 1 to more than 20, with an average of approximately 5.
On average, interest groups contributed just under $10,000 per legislator,
however the variation was quite large. Louisiana and Wyoming have the lowest
reported contributions per legislator with less than $200 in some years. California
has the highest reported contribution with more than $50,000 in 1999 and over
$100,000 in 2008 per legislator. The average percent for neighboring states with
policies is greater for acquisition policies than for safety and distribution: 39%,
16%, and 13% respectively. As expected, health care is an important issue. On
average, health care is a problem for 61% of a state’s population. Not surprisingly,
the descriptive statistics indicate that states do not typically have large rate of slack
resources. In fact, range indicates that some states have more expenditures than
they do revenue streams. While the 2009 national Gallup polls suggest slightly
higher rates than that presented in this analysis, the results from this analysis have
a consistent pattern in that conservative ideology is more prevalent than that of
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liberal ideology. According to the descriptive results, policymakers most often find
themselves in state governments with split party control. Table 9 indicates that on
average Democratic control of state legislatures occurs less often that of
Republican or Split Control.
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Factor
State population over the age
of 65
Proportion of Population
below FPL (Poverty)
Proportion of opulation over
25 with Bachelor’s Degree
Proportion of population living
in urban areas
Proportion of Population
healthy
Financial capacity
Staff per legislator
Neighboring States with Policy
Adoption

Mean
0.12

SD
Minimum Maximum
0.02
0.44
0.19

0.12

0.03

0.05

0.23

0.26

.046

0.14

0.38

0.73

0.17

0.30

0.99

0.85

0.05

0.65

0.92

0.05
0.16
4.87
4.15
0.39a
0.33a
0.16b
0.22b
0.13c
0.20c
$9,456 $13,783

-0.39
0.32
0.00a
0.00b
0.00c
$118

1.25
21.75
1.00a
1.00b
1.00c
$110,552

Interest group financial
support
Issue salience
0.86
0.42
0.71
0.95
Liberal political Ideology - %
0.47
0.26
0.00
0.98
liberal
Democratic Party Control
0.19
0.39
0
1
Republican Party Control
0.37
0.48
0
1
Split Party Control
0.44
0.49
0
1
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables over All State Years
(1999-2008) (n=500)
a

Proportion of neighboring policies with acquisition policies
Proportion of neighboring policies with safety policies
c
Proportion of neighboring policies with distribution policies
b
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Model Results

My hypotheses are based on the research premise that internal and
external factors influence the actions of decision makers when it comes to
prescription drug policy. A substantial amount of previous research is consistent
with my hypothesis (Walker 1969; Gray 1973, Berry and Berry 1990; Gray, Godwin
and Lowery 2007). The results of my research provide an addition to the previous
scholarship indicating a relationship between these factors and state policy
adoption.
In the empirical examination of factors effecting state adoption of
prescription drug policies, I estimated a series of negative binomial regression
models. The first model estimates the effect on policy adoption of acquisition
policies with all factors included in the model. The second model includes the
same factors but analyzes the effect on safety policy adoption, whereas the third
model analyzes the effect on distribution policy adoption. The following section
describes the results from each of the three models.
Acquisition
Prior to conducting the negative binomial regression, a histogram verified
that the data was in fact non-linear and thus not appropriate for linear regression.
Figure 14 illustrates that the count of prescription drug policies adopted over a tenyear period is skewed.
Table 10 displays the negative binomial regression model results for
prescription drug policy adoptions aimed at acquisition. There are several
important items to which one should pay particular attention. First, the log
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likelihood of –726.83 was statistically significant indicating that the predictor
variables are not equal to zero and the model is significantly different from zero.
This result suggests that the model ”fits” in the sense that it explains variation in
the dependent variable. Second, the likelihood ratio-test of alpha equal to zero
indicates that the data is over-dispersed and thus supports the use of a negative
binomial over a Poisson distribution. Figure 15 illustrates that the data fit a
negative binomial distribution better than the corresponding Poisson distribution.
The probability of a zero policies adopted increases from 0.25 using the Poisson
regression model to 0.57 with the negative binomial regression model. In
essence, Figure 15 illustrates that there is a larger probability for greater policy
counts in the negative binomial regression than that of the Poisson regression.
Lastly, the results indicate that with the exception of the educational
attainment variable, state composition variables did not influence the adoption of
acquisition policies. In other words, the variables served to indicate need were not
influential in the adoption of acquisition policies. The positive coefficient of
educational attainment indicates that for every one percent increase in the
percentage of the states’ population over the age of 25 who have a bachelor’s
degree, the difference in the logs of expected counts of the response variables is
expected to change by 7.91, while holding the other predictor variables constant.
Neighboring policy adoption and political ideology were statistically
significant in the effect on acquisition policy adoption. The analysis appears to
support the supposition that the policymaking of neighboring states makes a
difference. The greater the percent of the states’ neighbors who have adopted a
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policy, the greater the number of acquisition policies. The positive coefficient of
neighboring state policies indicates that for every one percent increase in the
percentage of states’ neighbors who have adopted an access policy, the difference
in the logs of expected counts of the response variables is expected to change by
1.45, while holding the other predictor variables constant.
Consistent with the theory, the results indicate that ideology tends to
correspond to higher counts of prescription drug policies aimed at access.
Specifically, the results suggest a positive effect between political ideology and
higher counts of state access prescription drug policies; the more liberal a state the
more access policies it adopts. The positive coefficient of neighboring state
policies indicates that for every one percent increase in the percentage of states’
population that indicate liberal ideology, the difference in the logs of expected
counts of the response variables is expected to change by 1.12, while holding the
other predictor variables constant. Based on the negative binomial regression
results, Figure 16 presents the factors that have an effect on state adoption of
prescription drug acquisition policies.
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Figure 14: Histogram of State Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies
This graph illustrates the data are strongly skewed, not conducive for linear
regression.
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Figure 15: Negative Binomial Distribution for Acquisition Model
This graph illustrates the data fit a negative binomial distribution better than the
poisson distribution.
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Variable
Proportion of state population over the age of
65
Proportion of population below FPL (Poverty)
Proportion of population over 25 with
Bachelor’s Degree
Proportion population living in urban areas
Proportion population healthy
Financial capacity
Staff per legislator
Proportion of Neighboring States with Policy
Adoption
Interest group financial support
Issue salience
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal
Republican Party Control
Split Party Control
Constant
Alpha

Coefficient
3.33
(3.47)

Z value
0.96

-1.05
(2.64)
7.91*
(2.13)
-0.59
(0.57)
-3.41
(1.96)
0.26
(0.54)
0.00
(0.03)
1.47*
(0.23)
0.00
(0.00)
-1.47
(1.96)
1.12*
(0.46)
0.28
(0.32)
0.02
(0.21)
-6.65
(2.25)
1.59
(0.21)

-0.40
3.71
-1.05
-1.73
0.49
0.26
6.37
1.42
-0.75
2.41
0.89
0.11
-2.95

Table 10: Results from Prescription Drug Acquisition Model, Negative Binomial
Regression 1999-2008.
Note: *p<0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis.
Log-likelihood = -726.83
Chi-Square(13) = 99.37
N=500

Henderson, Rochelle, 2010, UMSL, 137

Neighboring
State
Education

Ideology

Access
Figure 16: Predictor Variables of State Prescription Drug Acquisition Policies
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Safety
As indicated in Figure 17 the distribution of state prescription drug policies
aimed at safety is clearly skewed. Similar to the acquisition policies, the skewed
data suggest the use of a negative binomial regression analysis.
Table 11 displays the results Z scores and coefficients from the negative binomial
regression model for prescription drug safety policies. The log likelihood value of 289.47 was statistically further indicating the coefficients in the model are not equal
to zero. This result suggests that the model is fit. Additionally, the likelihood ratiotest (LR) of alpha equal to zero indicates that the data is over-dispersed,
supporting the use of a negative binomial over a Poisson distribution. Figure 18
indicates no benefit of the negative binomial distribution over the Poisson
distribution for safety policies. The probability of a zero policies adopted increases
from 0.78 using the Poisson regression model to 0.81 with the negative binomial
regression model. In essence, Figure 18 illustrates that there is a larger
probability, albeit only slightly, for greater policy counts in the negative binomial
regression than that of the Poisson regression.
Similar to the adoption of acquisition policies, the model did indicate that of
the population composite factors (i.e., elderly, poverty, educational attainment,
health status, and urbanization) only education were statistically significant. The
positive coefficient of educational attainment indicates that for every one percent
increase in the percentage of the states’ population over the age of 25 who have a
bachelor’s degree, the difference in the logs of expected counts of the response
variables is expected to change by 7.87, while holding the other predictor variables
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constant. In essence, the greater the proportion of state residents over the age of
25 with a bachelor’s degree the greater the probability of states adopting a
prescription drug policy aimed at safety. The proportion of as state’s population
with a bachelor’s degree was not only consistently influential across all three
models but it was the most influential.
The states’ financial capacity also appeared to influence state policy
adoption aimed at safety. The positive coefficient indicates that states with more
slack resources adopted more safety prescription drug policies. The positive
coefficient of financial capacity indicates that for every one percent increase in the
ratio of expenditures to revenue, the difference in the logs of expected counts of
the response variables is expected to change by 2.30, while holding the other
predictor variables constant. In essence, the results suggest that the greater the
state’s slack resources the greater the number of safety policies adopted.
The model results related to the influence of neighboring states with policy
adoptions is consistent with my hypothesis. The impact of neighboring policies
indicated that an increase in the percentage of neighboring states adopting a
prescription drug safety policy in the preceding year might result in an increase in
the estimated incidence of safety prescription drug policy by a factor of 1.62. In
essence, the results suggest that there a positive effect on the number of safety
policies adopted the greater the proportion of surrounding states who have
adopted prescription drug policy aimed at safety.
Additionally, the salience of an issue had an effect on the state prescription
drug policy adoption; however, it was counter to my hypothesis. The negative
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coefficient indicates that the greater the issue saliency the fewer policies adopted.
While the results are counter to my hypothesis, it suggests that health care as an
important issue results in fewer safety policy adoptions. One possible explanation
may be that attention to a prescription drug safety issue lessens the likelihood that
policies will actually be adopted. Figure 19 displays the negative binomial
regression factors that influence adoption of safety policies.
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Figure 17: Histogram of Prescription Drug Safety Policies
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Figure 18: Negative Binomial Distribution for Safety Model
This figure displays the proportion of policies adopted is consistent for both the
negative binomial and Poisson regression.
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Variable

Coefficient
Z value
8.35
1.41
Proportion of state population over the age of 65
(5.93)
Proportion of population below FPL (Poverty)
0.58
0.13
(4.51)
Proportion of population over 25 with Bachelor’s
7.87*
2.15
Degree
(3.64)
Proportion population living in urban areas
0.47
0.50
(0.95)
Proportion population healthy
-3.67
-1.69
(2.18)
Financial capacity
2.30*
2.55
(0.90)
Staff per legislator
-0.05
-1.20
(0.05)
Proportion of Neighboring States with Policy
1.62*
2.91
Adoption
(0.56)
Interest group financial support
0.00
0.49
(0.00)
Issue salience
-8.66*
-2.82
(3.07)
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal
-0.26
-0.37
(0.74)
Republican Party Control
-0.42
-0.84
(0.50)
Split Party Control
-0.44
-1.31
(0.34)
Constant
-1.87
-0,54
(3.36)
Alpha
2.29
(0.62)
Table 11: Results from Prescription Drug Safety Model, Negative Binomial
Regression 1999-2008.
Note: *p<0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis.
Log-likelihood = -289.47
Chi-Square(13) = 40.61
N=500
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Figure 19: Predictor Variables of State Prescription Drug Safety Policies
This graphic presents the significant factors in the negative binomial regression
analysis.
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Distribution
Figure 20 displays the distribution of state prescription drug distribution
policies. The histogram depicts the data is skewed to the right, thus supporting the
use of a negative binomial regression.
The negative binomial regression model results for prescription drug policy
adoptions are presented in Table 12. Based on the results, the log likelihood of 248.44 indicates a statistically significant model. This result suggests that the
model is fit. While Figure 21 indicates no benefit of the negative binomial
distribution compared to Poisson regression, the likelihood ratio-test (LR) of alpha
equal to zero indicates that the data is over-dispersed. Thus, the use of a negative
binomial was selected over a Poisson regression analysis.
Consistent with the access model, the negative binomial model using count
of distribution policies indicates that educational attainment and neighboring
policies influences policy adoption. A coefficient of 11.72 indicates that the
educational variable has the stronger effect. The impact of educational attainment
indicate that for every one percent increase in the percentage of the states’
population over the age of 25 who have a bachelor’s degree, the difference in the
logs of expected counts of the response variables is expected to change by 11.72,
while holding the other predictor variables constant.
The research appears to support the supposition that the policymaking of
neighboring states makes a difference. The greater the percent of the states’
neighbors who have adopted a policy, the greater the number of state prescription
drug policies aimed at distribution. Specifically, the coefficients indicate that a one
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unit increase in the percentage of neighbors with a distribution policy will have a
1.37 effect.
Also of considerable interest is the model results related to the influence of
interest groups. Unlike the models for safety and access, the distribution model
indicates that the financial contributions made by interest groups to policymakers
matter when it comes to state prescription drug policy aimed at distribution. While
the coefficient results (1.10) indicate a smaller effect than education, it is most
interesting to note that the financial contribution was not a factor for the other two
types of prescription drug policy. Figure 20 presents the factors that may influence
state adoption of prescription drug distribution policies as indicated by the negative
binomial regression results.
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Figure 20: Histogram of State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies
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Figure 21: Negative Binomial Distribution for Distribution Model
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Variable

Coefficient
Z value
12.52
1.92
Proportion of state population over the age of 65
(6.52)
Proportion of population below FPL (Poverty)
3.43
0.67
(5.10)
Proportion of population over 25 with Bachelor’s
11.72*
2.93
Degree
(3.99)
Proportion population living in urban areas
-1.49
-1.50
(0.99)
Proportion population healthy
-1.52
-0.49
(3.09)
Financial capacity
1.10
1.26
(0.88)
Staff per legislator
-0.04
-0.88
(0.05)
Proportion of Neighboring States with Policy
1.37*
2.28
Adoption
(0.60)
Interest group financial support
0.00*
2.38
(0.00)
Issue salience
-3.12
-0.86
(3.62)
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal
-0.30
-0.38
(0.80)
Republican Party Control
-0.63
-1.16
(0.55)
Split Party Control
-0.58
-1.67
(0.35)
Constant
-9.02
-2.20
(4.10)
Alpha
2.21
(0.68)
Table 12: Results from Prescription Drug Distribution Model, Negative Binomial
Regression 1999-2008.
Note: *p<0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis.
Log-likelihood = -248.44
Chi-Square(13) = 35.34
N=500
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Figure 22: Predictor Variables of State Prescription Drug Distribution Policies
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While each prescription drug policy type was explored separately, there are
several important items to notice about the results. First, the proportion of a state’s
population with a bachelor’s degree was not only consistently influential across all
three models but it was the most influential. Additionally, across all three of the
models, the state population composition variables, with the exception of
educational attainment, were not significant. This was a surprising finding in that
these factors served as indicators of need. As indicated by John Kingdon (2003),
policymakers may rely on indicators as to what issues are of public concern. Thus
as indicated in Chapter 2, one would suppose that states with a greater need (i.e.,
those with older, unhealthy, or poor) would have more policy adoptions. However,
the results indicate that the factors used to proxy the potential need for
pharmaceuticals were not influential in policy adoption. After further review, the
result may be explained from the fact that prescription medications is a subset part
of a larger health care issue and thus may not be influenced by the same factors
as health care in general.
Second, in each of the three models, the policymaking of neighboring states
made an impact. Thus the evidence does suggest that state legislators may rely
on the policymaking of neighboring states to address the challenges of constraints
(e.g., time and resources) or competitive federalism. As revealed in Chapter 2,
prescription drug policy can be complex thus the legislators may look to their
neighbor for assistance.
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Third and most notable, is the fact that the pattern of influence of key
variables across the three models is inconsistent. The theoretical supposition on
which this analysis originated was that the prescription drug policies are not
consistent and thus would be influenced by a variety of factors. These results
provide evidence to support the theoretical foundation. As seen in Table 20, the
significant factors do vary by prescription drug policy type. While two factors (i.e.,
educational attainment and neighboring state influence) are influential in two of the
models, the factors that affect prescription drug policy do vary by policy. For
example, financial capacity is only influential in safety policies. Additionally, the
importance of the health care issue is only significant in the safety model. Political
ideology is only a significant factor related to the adoption of acquisition policies,
whereas interest group financial support per legislator is only a significant factor
related to distribution policies.
Overall, the results suggest that the factors influencing adoption of state
prescription drug policy do differ. Neighboring state policymaking, educational
attainment, and political ideology affects prescription drug policy aimed at
acquisition. While the hypothesis that political ideology mattered was true for
acquisition policies, it was not influential in the adoption of distribution related
policies. This was a surprising result in that one would expect the more
conservative state ideology the less likely they would be to intervene in business in
terms of adopting regulatory policies and less likely to provide government
assistance in terms of access policies.
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Variable
Proportion of state population over
the age of 65
Proportion of population below FPL
(Poverty)
Proportion of population over 25 with
Bachelor’s Degree
Proportion population living in urban
areas
Proportion population healthy

Acquisition
Coefficient
3.33
(3.47)

Safety
Coefficient
8.35
(5.93)

Distribution
Coefficient
12.52
(6.52)

-1.05
0.58
3.43
(2.64)
(4.51)
(5.10)
7.91*
7.87*
11.72*
(2.13)
(3.64)
(3.99)
-0.59
0.47
-1.49
(0.57)
(0.95)
(0.99)
-3.41
-3.67
-1.52
(1.96)
(2.18)
(3.09)
Financial capacity
0.26
2.30*
1.10
(0.54)
(0.90)
(0.88)
Staff per legislator
0.00
-0.05
-0.04
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
Proportion of Neighboring States
1.47*
1.62*
1.37*
with Policy Adoption
(0.23)
(0.56)
(0.60)
Interest group financial support
0.00
0.00
0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Issue salience
-1.47
-8.66*
-3.12
(1.96)
(3.07)
(3.62)
% liberal political Ideology - % liberal
1.12*
-0.26
-0.30
(0.46)
(0.74)
(0.80)
Republican Party Control
0.28
-0.42
-0.63
(0.32)
(0.50)
(0.55)
Split Party Control
0.02
-0.44
-0.58
(0.21)
(0.34)
(0.35)
Constant
-6.65
-1.87
-9.02
(2.25)
(3.36)
(4.10)
Alpha
1.59
2.29
2.21
(0.21)
(0.62)
(0.68)
Table 13: Results from the Negative Binomial Models
Note: This table presents a side-by-side comparison of the coefficients for all three
negative binomial regression models. *p<0.05. N=500.
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Limitations

The study has several limitations. The first is the commonly accepted
limitation associated with data availability. Undoubtedly, the invention of the
internet has made data more readily available than at any other point in time;
however, researchers still face data limitations. Although there were obvious
situations (i.e., issue salience and interest groups) where ideal datasets were
not readily available, it is the belief of this researcher that the measurements
used serve as an adequate indicator to measure the intended construct.
Second, while regression analysis assists researchers in examining the
dependence of one variable on another it does not abdicate causation. In
essence, the presence of a relationship between X and Y variables does not
necessarily mean that X caused Y. In the case of state prescription drug
policy, the statistical significance of certain factors (e.g., ideology, education,
interest group support) does not indicate that these factors cause state
legislators to adopt policies, but simply that there is a relationship and to some
degree influence. The limitation in the ability to substantiate causality has a
direct impact on how the results may be applied.
While my dissertation provides insight into the variation of factors
influencing state prescription drug policy adoption, it does not provide indication
to the substantive question related to policy outcomes. Understanding what
factors are present in policy adoption are informative for activities of agenda
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setting, policy options and their expediency, appears to omit the major
component of whether or not the policy was successful.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of incredulity,
it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness…” Charles
Dickens from a Tale of Two Cities
Although written some time ago, Dickens’ quote seems as fitting to the
prescription drug world of today as it did in describing England and France during
the 18th century. The availability of new therapies, lower cost generics, and
innovative biotechnological medications has made this a provocative time in health
care. Specifically, over the past decade, new and lower cost prescription
medications have assisted patients in their quest for health and save overall health
care dollars. For example, evidence suggests consistently taking one’s medication
can reduce overall medical costs (American Diabetes Association, 2007; American
Heart Association, 2009; Sokol et al, 2005). However, the rising drug costs, drugs
removed from the market and pharmaceutical manufacturer profits have spawned
greater government attention to the issue or prescription drug policy. The focus of
this dissertation was to gain a better understanding as to what factors are
influential in states adopting pharmaceutical policies.
Future Research
While the analysis of prescription drug policy adoption expands on the
current state policy adoption literature, the analysis presented here could be
expanded to explore the impact of predictor variables. The variables selected for
this analysis were consistent with those used in seminal state policy adoption
literature. In addition, analysis could be expanded to analyze policies categorized
as Other.
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Future research could benefit from further exploration beyond that
dependent on quantitative analysis. According to William W. Watt, “Don’t put your
faith in what statistics say until you have carefully considered what they do not
say.” As such, one might explore a mixed-method approach using qualitative data
of interviewing state legislators on the issue of prescription drug policy. In terms of
statistical research, future research might explore the use of Cox regression or
more sophisticated statistical techniques such as those indicated in the BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004 article.
Related to the affect of neighboring states on prescription drug policy, future
research might include analysis of policies resulting from federal government
legislative activity. For example, there was significant activity after the passage of
the Medicare Modernization act; presumably in reaction to the federal policies.
However, not all states adopted MMA related policies, thus it would be interesting
to look at difference between the two.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
While political science scholars have spent over 40 years expanding on the
seminal work of Walker (1969) and researchers have investigated a variety of
policy areas, the results from this analysis indicate there is always room for more
analysis on state policy adoption (Walker 880-99;Mohr 111-26;Gray 1174-85;Berry
and Berry 395-415;Case, Hines, and Rosen 285-307;Mintrom 41-59;Berry and
Baybeck 505-19). This dissertation expands on the existing literature by
examining the variation of factor influence within one particular policy area.
Specifically, this dissertation explored the idea that factors influential in state policy
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adoption were not consistent within one policy area, but rather the influential
factors are as varied as the policies themselves.
While the analysis is limited to the last decade of state prescription drug
policies, the research and subsequent findings expand on the innovation and
diffusion literature. The research is of particular importance in our understanding
of factors present in state policy adoption of a particular health care issue. In
particular, the study contributes to our understanding of what factors are influential
in the area of state prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition, safety, and
distribution.
Consistent with previous research of Gray, et al (2007), this analysis
establishes that organized interests had little effect on the passage of prescription
policy adoption related to acquisition (i.e., Pharmacy Assistance Programs).
However, the results from this dissertation indicate that the findings of interest
group influence should not be applied to all prescription drug policies but rather
judiciously depending on the policy objective. In the case of state prescription drug
distribution policies, whose objective is to regulate distributors, the findings
suggest that interest group contributions to state legislators were influential when
related to distribution policies but not influential in acquisition and safety related
policies.
The study further supports the existing theory that neighboring state
policymaking influences state policy adoption. While previous scholars have
explored the impact of neighboring policy adoption, this research broadens our
application the neighboring state effect to additional policy topic areas.
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Metaphorically speaking, the results indicate that what is going on next door
matters. Specifically, the policymaking of neighboring states was influential in all
three types of prescription drug policy.
One of the most provocative questions, not only political scientists but for
citizens as well, is whether or not public opinion matters. Does the public
preference influence the policies adopted by lawmakers? In the 2009 health care
reform debate many would argue the fact that public opinion matters, but on the
issue of state prescription drug policy it was only influential in the case of safety
policies. One could speculate that news coverage may be greater on prescription
drug safety issues as opposed to distribution or acquisition. However, without
specific public opinion data or data on state news coverage it is difficult to
ascertain why issue saliency was a factor for safety as opposed to acquisition or
distribution policies.
While the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010 is
undoubtedly a monumental event, much of what had already been accomplished
in terms of access to health care has come at the state level. For an example of
state activism on the issue of health care, one need only look at the number of
prescription drug policies aimed at acquisition to get a sense of the work done at
the state level. As presented in this dissertation, states vary in their policies
adopted and the factors influencing those adoptions. As the federal government
begins implementation, the results presented in this dissertation suggest that the
institutional, demographic, political party control and public preference may
influence how the policy is implemented at the state levels.
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APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES

Variable
State
Year
Predictor Variables
Need: Elderly
Need: Poverty
Need: Education
Need: Urbanization
Need: Health Status

Capacity: Fiscal
Capacity:
Professionalization
Neighbor Adoption
Interest Group
Issue Salience
Ideology
Party Control
Dependent Variables
Access policies
Safety policies
Distribution policies

Description

Source
Two digit state abbreviation
1999-2008

Percent of state population over 65 yrs of
age
Percent of state population below the
federal poverty level
Percent of state population over the age of
25 with a Bachelor’s degree
Percent of state population living in
metropolitan statistical area
Percent of survey respondents who
indicated “Good Health” on the BRFFs
survey
Percentage of total state revenue minus the
total state spending
Number of staff per legislator

U.S. Bureau of the Census (various
years)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various
years)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various
years)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (various
years)
Center for Chronic Disease Control

Number of neighboring states with policy in
preceding year
Dollar amount spent per legislative seat in
2004
Percent of respondents who indicated
health care is an important issue
Citizen ideology ranging 0 to 1 with 1 being
liberal
Split political party

National Conference of State
Legislatures (various years)
Follow the money.org

Count of prescription drug policies aimed at
access
Count of prescription drug policies aimed at
safety
Count of prescription drug policies aimed at
distribution

U.S. Bureau of the Census (various
years)
National Conference of State
Legislatures (various years)

Center for Chronic Disease Control
Berry, Ringquist, Fording and
Hanson
National Conference of State
Legislatures (various years)
NCSL
NCSL
NCSL
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